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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation studies the bias in newsvendor (NV) decision-making and its effect on 
the performance of NV supply chain.  Studies in NV decision-making have shown human 
decisions to systematically deviate from the profit maximizing solutions of various utility 
models.  Yet for the most part the impacts of this human decision bias in systems of 
newsvendor type products have not been investigated.  NV’s initial wealth and alternative 
NV requisition policies are proposed as sources of human decision bias. 
Effects of individual’s initial wealth on NV decision-making are analyzed in risk-
aversion and loss-aversion NV utility models.  Analysis of the risk-averse utility model 
reveals conflicting effects of NV’s initial wealth on NV decision-making due to different 
Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute risk-aversion.  The analysis of loss-averse utility model 
predicts wealthier NV to order more than poorer NV under a maximum undesirable 
wealth assumption.   
Effects of various competing newsvendor requisition policies are analyzed in a 
human decision bias (HDB) model.  The HDB model facilitates the comparative analysis 
of individual decision-making in various conditions of NV systems.  This model also 
identifies the anchoring and adjustment effect in the single NV context.  A multi-echelon 
version of HDB model shows NV supplier’s reliance of demand chasing heuristics in the 
multi-echelon NV context.  The HDB model is expected to improve NV supply chain 
design by accounting for human decision bias.   
Hypotheses of the effects of NV’s initial wealth and alternative NV requisition 
policies on individual NV decision-making are empirically tested in single and multi-
 xv  
echelon NV experiments.  More than 9000 NV decisions from 171 student subjects 
collected over a span of more than 6 months were analyzed in various statistical methods.   
Statistical analyses of single NV experiments support the hypotheses of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and loss-aversion.  Factorial experiment 
analysis results show NV’s initial wealth term and item profit margin term to 
significantly affect NV decision-making.  Regression analyses fail to reject hypotheses of 
dominant alternative NV requisition policies to the EOQ policy.  The statistical analyses 
of multi-echelon NV experiment found item profit margin, NV’s initial wealth, and 
relationship between supplier and retailer to significantly affect newsvendor decision-
making.   
Finally, the performance of NV systems suffers as a result of human decision 
bias.  The empirical evidences of all NV experiments show that human decision bias 
reduces the profitability in both the single and the multi-echelon settings.  A hypothetical 
case study of an organic food manufacturer further illustrates how human decision bias 
affects the optimal solution of a supply chain design and reduces overall supply chain 
profit.  We believe this research has advanced the theory of human decision bias in the 
NV supply chain systems.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Consider a newsvendor who has only one opportunity in the morning to decide how 
many newspapers to order to satisfy the day’s demand.  If he orders too much, his cost 
will be too high.  If he orders too little, he will miss out on additional profit.  This 
practical and well studied problem is often called the single period newsvendor problem 
(SPP).  The objective of SSP is to identify an order quantity that will balance the costs of 
ordering too little, a.k.a. stock out costs and the costs of ordering too much, a.k.a. overage 
costs. 
SPP is a foundational paradigm of the research in stochastic inventory systems.  
This simple inventory decision model is reflective of many real life situations and is 
frequently used to assist human decision-making in fashion manufacturing and retail 
industry (Gallego and Moon, 1993) as well as service industry such as hotels and airlines 
(Pfeifer and Weatherford, 1994).  For example, a fashion manufacturer will have to 
decide on its raw material and human resource requirements before the launch of a new 
product which becomes obsolete very quickly. 
The economic impact of newsvendor decision-making is enormous.  The US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov) has reported that the non durable good 
industry accounted for $2 trillion and the service industry accounted for more than $4 
trillion of US annual gross domestic product in 2002.  Food and apparel industries, most 
frequently modeled by SPP, accounted for more than $1.4 trillion of US GDP in 2002.  
Healthy life styles have increased the demand for fresh produce, which accounted for 9% 
of the $900 billion food industry in 2002.  Any slight improvement to the decision-
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making in these newsvendor type business settings will undoubtedly increase 
profitability.  For example, a fashion industry firm realized a 60% increase in profit when 
it implemented an algorithm to assist firm’s managers with newsvendor decision-making 
(Fisher et al., 1996). 
As product life cycles become shorter, more extensions to the classic SPP model 
are being considered (Moutaz, 1999 and Silver et al., 1998) such as how different risk 
preferences influence the decision-maker’s order quantity.  Agrawal and Seshadri (2000), 
for example show that a risk-averse newsvendor orders less than the optimal quantity of 
the risk neutral solution. 
Empirical results of NV decision-making have discovered the subject’s decision 
to systematically deviate from the well known theoretical SPP optimal solution.  This 
human decision bias was first reported in a well conditioned experimental-based research 
on SPP in which subjects with prior classroom knowledge of SPP ordered too few of the 
high profit items and ordered too much of the low profit items (Schweitzer and Cachon, 
2000).  Bolton and Katok (2004) proposed different learning-by-doing environments to 
enhance the newsvendor performance by providing feedbacks to the subjects during the 
experiments.  Though none of the 3 methods proposed completely eliminated human 
decision bias, a 10-period standing order strategy was identified to be most promising in 
improving newsvendor decision-making.  Given the significance of SPP model, this 
persistent bias from its optimal solution definitely warrants a more thorough 
investigation. 
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This research contributes to the literature of SPP by providing the much needed 
laboratory evidence to validate various theoretical results of SPP.  This empirical 
research of the SPP is important because:  
(1) Without some empirical work, the practicality of newsvendor models cannot 
be assessed (Anwari, 1987).  However, no laboratory evidence of SPP was found prior to 
2000; 
(2) Empirical data contradicts optimal solutions proposed by SPP models.  The 
first empirical work on the SPP revealed a consistent deviation of newsvendor decision 
from the optimal solutions predicted by various utility models of SPP (Schweitzer and 
Cachon, 2000); 
(3) Human decision bias is a reality and could not be eliminated by learning 
enhancement.  The second and the latest empirical work on SPP revealed that the 
newsvendor decision bias remained in spite of enhancement to the learning environment 
by providing newsvendor subjects with improved decision support system (DSS) and 
reduction of potential decision error (reduced from 299/300 to 2/3) (Bolton and Katok, 
2004);  
(4) Many factors theoretically shown to affect newsvendor decision-making have 
not been empirically tested.  Thus far, empirical studies of newsvendor decision-making 
have mainly focused on item profit margin as the main factor influencing human 
decision-making.  For example, the significance of newsvendor’s initial wealth, 
theoretically determined to be positively correlated to newsvendor order quantity 
(Eeckhoudt et al, 1995) has not been empirically tested;  
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(5) Potential problems of human decision bias found in systems of newsvendor 
type products have not been assessed.  Stochastic optimization models used in the supply 
chain design problem often assume retailers order as consumer demand distribution 
predicts.  Any human decision bias exhibited by the retailers of newsvendor type 
products might cause the model solution to be theoretically sub-optimal.  Understanding 
and modeling human decision bias in the non-durable product systems might provide 
significant economic benefit due to the size of these industries. 
This research will extend the current research of the SPP by specifically 
answering questions such as: 
1. Does a newsvendor with higher initial wealth order more than a newsvendor 
with lower initial wealth? 
2. Is there evidence that higher salvage value increases the bias towards more 
order quantity? 
3. Does classroom learning of SPP improve newsvendor decision-making? 
4. Does relationship between newsvendors affect the system performance? 
5. How does human decision bias affect the design of NV systems? 
In order to answer these important questions, we first set up a newsvendor 
decision-making model as a framework of our study of newsvendor’s reliance on various 
NV requisition policies.  These NV requisition policies are alternative to the classic NV 
requisition policy.  Then, factorial experiments are conducted in single newsvendor and 
multi-echelons newsvendor settings to assess how different factors such as item profit 
margin, NV’s initial wealth, item salvage value, and NV training affect newsvendor 
decision-making.  Regression analysis and hypothesis testing methods are utilized to 
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analyze a human decision bias model of different newsvendor ordering heuristics.  
Finally, we present case studies illustrating the implications of human decision bias on 
the performance of systems involving newsvendor type products. 
The rest of this dissertation is arranged in the following order.  Relevant literature 
reviews and extensions of SPP are presented in Chapter 2.  Qualitative sensitivity 
analysis of how different initial wealth levels affect decision-maker’s order quantity is 
presented in Chapter 3.  A human decision bias model of various newsvendor requisition 
policies is discussed in Chapter 4.  Single and multi-echelon newsvendor experiment 
analyses are presented in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively.  A thorough discussion of the 
impact of human decision bias on the performance supply chain design and a case study 
of the US fresh produce industry are presented in Chapter 7.  Chapter 8 summarizes some 
key empirical results of human decision bias in single and multi-echelon newsvendor 
settings and discusses the implication of our research to other Operation Research fields 
as well as possible extensions to this research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this Chapter, we discuss previous research in the newsvendor model with risk followed 
by work in human decision bias.   
2.1 Newsvendor Problem and Extensions 
The literature of the newsvendor (NV) problem, the archetype of stochastic 
inventory research, is vast and its complete coverage is beyond the scope of any single 
chapter.  Khouja (1999) provides a systematic categorization of various extensions to the 
classic single period problem (SPP).  Some of the categories proposed such as: i) 
different objectives and utility functions, ii) multiple periods, and iii) multi-echelon 
systems are closely related to our research. 
Consider a newsvendor who has only one opportunity in the morning to decide 
how many newspapers to order to satisfy the day’s demand, D.  Let f be the probability 
distribution function of the day’s demand and let F be its cumulative probability 
distribution.  If he orders too much, his cost will be too high.  If he orders too little, he 
will miss out on additional profit.  If the overage cost, co (item cost, c – salvage value, s) 
and the shortage cost, cs (item price, p – item cost, c) are equals, it makes sense for the 
newsvendor to place an order quantity, q in such a way that the probability of demand 
less than q, F(q) equals the probability of actual demand exceeding q, 1-F(q).  Therefore, 
the newsvendor should order an amount of newspaper equivalent to average demand, D .  
However, when the overage cost and the shortage cost are not equals, how then should 
the newsvendor order? If co is greater than cs, then it makes sense to order less than D , 
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because the profit from an extra item sold is not worth as much as the cost of an extra 
item not sold.  If co is less than cs, then it makes sense to order more than D , because the 
profit from an extra item sold is worth more than the cost of an extra item not sold.  
Therefore, the optimal order quantity, q* that balances the expected overage cost and the 
expected shortage cost would need to satisfy: 







=)( *      (1) 






as the critical fractile of SPP.  The rest 
of this dissertation defines critical fractile > 0.5 as high profit margin and critical fractile 
< 0.5 as low profit margin. 
An important extension to the SPP for our work is incorporating risk preferences 
of the decision-maker.  Lau (1980) considers the newsvendor problem under a new 
objective of maximizing expected utility in the form of E[Q] - λVar[Q], where Q is the 
return of investment and λ is the measure of risk aversion of the decision-maker.  The 
analysis on the optimal solutions to SPP with different values of λ determines that an 
increase in risk-aversion negatively affects order quantity.  Eeckhoudt, et al. (1995) 
examined the comparative static effects of different price and cost parameters in a risk-
averse SPP framework.  The risk-averse newsvendor was shown to order less as risk 
increases. 
Another extension of SPP is the case where the newsvendor can adjust the selling 
price of the item.  Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) showed the impact of uncertainty and 
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risk aversion on the price and order quantity in the newsvendor problem.  Demand was 
assumed to be a function of selling price.  Investigators further defined a scale effect as a 
scaling of both the mean and the variance of the demand distribution and a location effect 
as the shifting of the mean of demand distribution without affecting the variance.  If price 
affected the scale of the demand distribution, the risk averse newsvendor was found to 
order less and set higher price.  If price affected the location of the demand, the risk-
averse newsvendor was found to set lower price.  Order quantity of the risk-averse 
newsvendor could not be determined because while lower price generates higher demand, 
an increase in risk-aversion will result in reduction of order quantity. 
A newsvendor with multiple investment options is concerned about the 
covariance of risks of these investment options.  Anvari (1987) modeled this single 
period newsvendor problem using a well known capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
first independently proposed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).  Contrary to other 
working-capital decisions such as those proposed by Lau (1980), which might imply 
divergence of shareholders’ and managers’ objectives, the use of CAPM to analyze 
inventory problems need not imply conflicting assumptions.  The resulting optimal policy 
is characterized and compared with the classical expected benefit maximization 
framework.  It is shown that when the relevant risk of inventory investment is considered, 
the optimal order quantity can be dramatically lower than that of classic SPP model.  
Chung (1990) later tightens the optimality conditions and provides a simple solution 
method for normally distributed demand.   
Inderfurth and Schefer (1996) extend SPP to a multi-period framework and 
present a periodic order-up-to-S policy.  Optimality conditions for the reorder level S are 
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derived for both the back-order and the lost-sales case.  They analyze the effects of cost 
and price parameters, capital market data, and demand risk, in terms of correlation 
between demand and market return, on the reorder level.  They find that as correlation 
between demand and market return increases, so does the risk in demand.  Higher 
demand risk increases the opportunity cost of investment in inventory, and therefore, the 
reorder level of newsvendor product decreases. 
2.2 Biases in Human Decision-Making 
Limitations and biases in human decision-making have been well studied by 
psychologists and experimental economists.  A particular human decision bias is the 
anchoring and adjustment effect.  Human decision often arises from adjustment of a prior 
decision.  Therefore, different starting values yield different estimates over time, which 
are biased towards initial values.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) demonstrated this effect 
by asking subjects to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United Nation.  
Subjects first observed a random number between 0 and 100, then asked if the random 
number was too high or too low of an estimate.  Then the subjects were asked to provide 
a numerical estimate of the percentage of African states represented in United Nations.  
The results showed the random arbitrary number significantly affected the subjects’ 
estimates, such as those who received 65 guessed 45% and those who received 10 
guessed 25%. 
 Northcraft and Neale (1987) found that anchoring and adjustment bias was a 
limitation of decision-making in the business world with novice and expert decision-
makers.  Their results suggested that past experience and training did not have any impact 
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on changing this human decision bias.  Many computer based decision support systems 
(DSS) claimed to counter the anchoring and adjustment bias effect.  Ahuja et al. (2000) 
tested a DSS designed to mitigate such anchoring and adjustment bias in a real estate 
pricing game and found that the anchoring and adjustment bias remained robust.  The 
computer based DSS did not successfully mitigate or eliminate human decision bias 
because “the (human decision) bias that operates without the information system 
continues to operate within it.” 
2.3 Human Decision Bias in the Inventory Systems 
Sterman (1989) stresses the need to incorporate the limitations and biases of 
human decision-making into management science and economics models: 
“Studies in the psychology of individual choice have identified numerous 
cognitive and other bounds on human rationality, often producing 
systematic errors and biases.  Yet for the most part models of aggregate 
phenomena in management science and economics are not consistent with 
such micro-empirical knowledge of individual decision-making.”  
Some experimental economics studies have been conducted on supply chain systems of a 
single durable product to investigate human decision-making.  Sterman (1989) modeled 
an inventory manager’s behavior in a stock management game (the beer game).  The 
decision model comprised of a desirable level of incoming inventory, a desirable level of 
current inventory, and a predicted level of outgoing inventory.  Inventory managers were 
found to be biased towards the current inventory.  Estimated parameters of the weigh 
subjects placed on current inventory had significantly higher value than those of 
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incoming inventory.  This human behavioral bias caused the amplification and oscillation 
of demand in the supply chain. 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) confirmed that decision bias existed in the 
newsvendor problem.  Groups of MBA students who had received training on the 
newsvendor problem within the last year were recruited as “expert” newsvendors.  Each 
newsvendor had same initial wealth and was well informed of the characteristics of the 
demand.  The experiments were conducted over both the high profit margin and the low 
profit margin conditions, ceteris paribus.  The experiment was repeated 15 times and 
subjects were provided feedback after each round.  Results from these studies 
demonstrated that decision-makers’ choices systematically deviated from those that 
maximized expected profit.  Subjects ordered too few of high-profit products and too 
many of low-profit products.  Investigators conclude: 
“These results are not consistent with many objective formulations such as risk-
aversion, risk-seeking preferences, prospect theory preferences, waste aversion, 
stock-out aversion, or the consequences of underestimating opportunity costs…A 
better understanding of actual behavior in real processes may lead to the 
discovery that traditional assumptions need modification, and that new techniques 
may be required to correctly optimize these systems.” 
Motivated by the human decision bias found in the newsvendor problem, Bolton 
and Katok (2004) investigated the effects of enhancement to the learning environment on 
the quality of newsvendor decision-making.  Specifically, they set up three separate 
studies to investigate the effects of the extended experience and enhanced feedback on 
newsvendor decision-making.  In the first study, a 100-period newsvendor game, 
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investigators showed that as the game participants gathered more experience about the 
game, they tended to order closer to the optimum level.  The second study focused on the 
effectiveness of various feedback enhancements such as information concerning the 
payoff of foregone options and a 10-period moving average of demand.  Investigators 
found that none of these enhanced feedbacks had any significant effects on the quality of 
the newsvendor decision.  In the last study, investigators tested the effectiveness of a 
standing order policy which restricted the game participants “to ordering a fixed quantity 
for a sequence of 10 periods”.  Under the standing order policy, the quality of 
newsvendor decision improved dramatically.  This result suggested the potential benefits 
of limiting decision-maker’s ability to react to short term trends.  The practicality of such 
constraint in the real industry setting has not been addressed. 
After reviewing theoretical analysis of various extensions to the newsvendor 
problem, another writer concludes, “Without some empirical work examining real life 
objectives of managers… the practicality of these (newsvendor) models cannot be 
assessed.” (Anwari, 1987).  
Current empirical studies, citing different newsvendor ordering heuristics as 
sources of human decision bias (Cachon and Schweitzer, 2000) lack a framework to test 
the newsvendor’s preference on these heuristics.  Therefore, a natural extension of the 
empirical research of SPP is a formulation of human decision bias model of multiple 
objectives to investigate newsvendor’s reliance on these objectives.  This model and its 
extension will be used throughout this dissertation as a comparative static framework to 
identify decision-makers’ preferred ordering heuristics under different empirical study 
conditions.   
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Current empirical studies in SPP have mainly considered item profit margin as the 
main factor to influence newsvendor decision-making.  Our work will extend the 
empirical studies of a single newsvendor decision-making to investigate the effects of 
initial wealth, item’s salvage value, and a priori NV training on newsvendor decision-
making.  These factors have been proposed in the theoretical analysis of SPP to 
significantly affect newsvendor decision-making.  Our work will provide the 
experimental evidence to validate if these factors are indeed significant. 
Current empirical studies in SPP have only tested the newsvendor decision-
making in a single newsvendor setting.  Subjects in the single newsvendor setting faced 
computer generated demand.  Our research will extend these empirical studies to a multi-
echelon newsvendors setting where subjects will face both the computer generated and 
the human generated demand.  These experiments will provide insights into the effect of 
supplier-retailer relationship on the performance of multi-echelon newsvendor systems.   
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CHAPTER 3: EFFECTS OF INITIAL WEALTH ON NEWSVENDOR 
DECISION-MAKING 
 
In this Chapter we investigate the effect of initial wealth, w0, on newsvendor decision-
making under several alternative utility functions including risk-aversion, loss-aversion, 
bankruptcy-aversion, and a combination of loss and risk-aversion.  Utility model analyses 
will reveal that NV’s initial wealth can influence NV order quantity to deviate from the 
optimal order quantity. 
3.1 Risk-Averse Newsvendor 
In this section we investigate the effect of wo on the optimal order quantity of a risk-
averse newsvendor, qa*.  We specifically answer the question: Does higher w0 imply 
higher optimal order quantity for a risk-averse newsvendor? The answer to this question, 
as we will show, depends on the type of newsvendor’s risk-aversion.  We first present the 
notation used: 
w:  The wealth of the newsvendor.   
w0:  The initial wealth of the newsvendor. 
u(w):  The newsvendor’s utility function ( we assume to be twice differentiable 
and monotonically increasing in w).   
u’(w):  The marginal utility of the newsvendor’s wealth ( We assume wealth to be 
desirable and hence u’(w) > 0). 
u’’(w):  The rate of change of the marginal utility of newsvendor’s wealth (By the 
definition of risk preference: (1) a risk-averse newsvendor has u’’(w) < 0, 
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(2) a risk-neutral newsvendor has u’’(w) = 0, and (3) a risk-seeking 
newsvendor has u’’(w) > 0). 
q*:  The optimal order quantity of a risk-neutral newsvendor with a utility 
maximizing objective (It is well known that the optimal order quantity of a 
risk-averse newsvendor, qa* is less than q* and the optimal order quantity 
of a risk-seeking newsvendor, qs* is more than q* (Eeckhoudt et al. 1995, 
and Schweitzer et al. 2000)). 
ru(w):  Arrow-Pratt Measures of Absolute Risk-Aversion (Pratt (1964) and Arrow 




wuwru −= .  By the definitions of u, u’(w), and u’’(w), we see that 
ru(w)>0 implies risk-aversion.  The greater ru(w) is the more risk-averse a 
newsvendor is.  Furthermore, ru(w)=0 and ru(w)<0 describe risk-neutral 
and risk-seeking respectively). 
Three categories of absolute risk-aversion are described by the derivative of ru(w) 
as follows: 
ru’(w) >0: Increasing Absolute Risk-Aversion (IARA) means the newsvendor is 
more risk-averse when she is wealthier.  An example of IARA utility 
function is u(w) = a + bw - cw2 where c > 0 and w<b/2c which has u’(w) 









cwru .  Notice that this quadratic utility function holds 
only for a limited range of w < b/2c, beyond which the additional wealth 
results in declining utility.   
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ru’(w) =0: Constant Absolute Risk-Aversion (CARA) means the newsvendor’s 
risk-aversion does not change with her wealth.  An example of a CARA 
utility function (Pratt, 1964) is wewu −−=)(  which has wewu −=)('  and 
wewu −−=)('' .  Thus, 1)( =wru  and 0)(' =wru . 
ru’(w) <0: Decreasing Absolute Risk-Aversion (DARA) means the newsvendor is 
less risk-averse when she is wealthier.  An example of a DARA utility 
function (Pratt, 1964) is αwwu =)(  where )1,0(: ∈Rα .  It has 













Baron (1973) shows that newsvendor’s optimal order quantity decreases as her 
risk-aversion increases.  The directions of the optimal order quantity change as a function 
of the initial wealth change are given in Table 1 for each of the risk categories.   
Table 1: Optimal Order Quantities of Various Risk-Averse Newsvendors 
 IARA CARA DARA 
Increase in wo qa* decreases qa* unchanged qa* increases 
Decrease in wo qa*increases qa* unchanged qa* decreases 
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3.2 Loss-Averse Newsvendor 
In this section we investigate the effect of initial wealth, wo, on the optimal order quantity 
of a loss-averse newsvendor, ql*.  We specifically answer the question: Does higher wo 
imply higher ql*?  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first defined loss-aversion as follows: “An 
individual is loss-averse if she or he dislikes symmetric 50-50 bets and, moreover, the 
aversion to such bets increases with the absolute size of the stakes.” Consider the 



















      (1) 
where: 
un(w) : The utility function of a risk-neutral newsvendor such as un(w) = w.   
λ : The degree of loss-aversion ( λ > 1).     
It has been shown that the optimal order quantity of a loss-averse newsvendor, ql* 
is less than the risk-neutral benchmark, q*.  Further, ql* decreases as degree of loss-
aversion increases (Cachon and Schweitzer, 2000).  The graphical representation of the 
risk-averse utility function is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Risk Neutral Utility and Loss-Averse Utility 
In this Figure, the expected utility of a loss-averse decision maker is less than that 
of a risk-neutral decision maker.  Therefore, the loss-averse newsvendor will avoid the 
risk of losing money by ordering less than a risk neutral newsvendor would.  Simulation 
of the optimal order quantities for different values of λ reveals a downward trend of 
optimal order quantity for higher values of λ as shown in Figure 2.   
u(w) ul(w) 
w0       w 
Risk Neutral Utility Loss-Averse Utility 
w0       w 
Ε[u(w)] 
Ε[ul(w)] 
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Figure 2: Expected Utility vs.  Order Quantity under Various Penalty Values 
However, notice that ul(w) is independent of wo and therefore ql* is also 
independent of wo.  That is, the optimal order quantity of a loss-averse newsvendor with a 
constant degree of loss-aversion is independent of his initial wealth, wo. 
Next, we extend the loss-averse utility in (1) to include a maximum undesirable 


































   (2)
 
where 
wo : The initial wealth. 
Q : The profit function of order quantity and demand. 
WT : A maximum undesirable level of w and WT=0 implies bankruptcy is 
undesirable. 
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λ1, λ2 : The degrees of loss-aversion ( λ2 > λ1 > 1). 
Graphical comparison between ulm(w) with un(w) (Figure 3) shows that the 
aversion to loss increases when the wealth of the decision maker falls below a fixed 
threshold value, WT.  An example of a maximum undesirable wealth level is 0 which 
would imply that bankruptcy is undesirable.  Notice also the condition λ2 > λ1 > 1 ensures 
a diminishing marginal rate of utility.  The utility function ulm(w), which is a concave 
transformation of its risk neutral counterpart (Figure 3), has an optimal order quantity, 
qlm*, that is less than the risk-neutral benchmark, q*. 
 
Figure 3: Graphs of Risk Neutral Utility and Loss-Averse Utility with Maximum Undesirable Wealth 
The introduction of a WT to the utility function changes the impact of wo on the 
optimal newsvendor order quantity.  We will show that the optimal order quantity of a 
wealthier newsvendor, qWRA*, is higher than that of a poorer newsvendor, qPRA*. 
First, we define a wealthy newsvendor (WRA) as one whose maximum loss, Qmin, 
satisfies the conditions: Qmin < 0 and wo + Qmin > WT.  A poor newsvendor (PRA) is 
un(w) 
ulm(w) 
WT   w0        w 
u(w) 
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defined as a newsvendor who is presented with a similar newsvendor investment 
opportunity as WRA, where the investment option has a maximum loss, Qmin, that 
satisfies the conditions: Qmin < 0 and wo + Qmin < WT. 
 
Figure 4: Graphs of the WRA Utility Function 
Proposition 1: The optimal order quantity of a wealthy loss-averse decision maker 
(WRA), qWRA* is less than the optimal order quantity of a risk neutral decision maker, qn*. 
Proof: From the definition of a wealthy newsvendor, wo + Qmin > WT, and therefore the 
utility function uWRA(w) is reduced to ul(w) as shown in Figure 4.  Since ql* < qn*, it 
follows that qWRA* < qn*.  
 
Proposition 2: The optimal order quantity of a poor loss-averse decision maker (PRA), 
qPRA* is less than the optimal order quantity of WRA newsvendor, qWRA*. 
Proof: We define PA as probability that Q > 0, PB as probability that Q < 0 and wo + Q > 
WT, PC as probability that Q < 0 and wo + Q < WT.  Notice that PA + PB + PC = 1 and PC 
µ(w) µWRA(w) 
WT      w0   w 
Risk Neutral Utility WRA Utility 
w0       w 
Ε[µ(w)] 
Ε[µWRA(w)] 
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WT   wo       w 
uWRA(w) uPRA(w) WRA Utility PRA Utility 
wo       w 
Ε[uPRA(w)] 
Ε[uWRA(w)] 
> 0.  Since λ2 > λ1, so it follows that the expected utility of a PRA decision maker, 
E[uPRΑ]<E[uWRA] as shown in Figure 5.  This implies qPRA* < qWRA*.  
 
Figure 5: Graphs of the PRA Utility Function 
 The analysis of the utility of a loss-averse newsvendor reveals two different 
results as shown in Table 2.  The initial wealth of a loss-averse newsvendor, wo, affects 
newsvendor decision making when a fixed maximum undesirable wealth threshold exists, 
and the maximum loss (or a minimum profit), Qmin, incurred results in wo + Qmin < WT.  
Otherwise wo has no impact on loss-averse newsvendor decision-making. 
Table 2: Optimal Order Quantity of a Loss-Averse Newsvendor 
 Loss-Aversion Loss-Aversion + WT 
High wo ql* unchanged qlm* = ql* 
Low wo ql* unchanged qlm* < ql* 
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3.3 Loss and Risk-Averse Newsvendor 
In this section we discuss the effect of initial wealth, wo, on the optimal order quantity of 
a loss and risk-averse newsvendor.  This result extends from the current utility analysis of 
risk-aversion and loss-aversion.  A generally risk-averse person can become fearful of 
losses when presented with an opportunity to invest in a risky investment.  This loss-
aversion effect can be described by a concave transformation of the person’s utility 
function prior to becoming loss-averse.  We purpose the use of concave transformation of 
the risk-averse utility function to create a loss and risk-averse utility function that is 
dependent on random variables w and wo. 





















   (3) 
where 
ua(w) : The risk-averse utility function. 
l(wo) : The loss-aversion function of wo where 0< l(wo) < 1. 
Loss aversion by definition is equivalent to a utility function that is steeper for 
losses than for gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  A concave transformation of a 
risk-averse utility function by the proportion-of-wealth function, l(wo) creates the 
“steeper losses than for gains” property as shown in Figure 6.  A discount function of 
wealth, 1- l(wo), in the case of loss satisfies the condition ua(wo1)= ula(wo2, wo3) where wo1 
<wo2< wo3.  This means that the utility of wo2 for a newsvendor given initial wealth of wo3 
is equal to the utility of a newsvendor with initial wealth of wo1.  Since ula(w) is a concave 
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transformation of ul(w), the optimal order quantity of a loss and risk-averse newsvendor, 
qla* is less than that of a risk-averse newsvendor, qa*, since the expected utility function 
ula(w) is less than expected ua(w). 
 
Figure 6: Loss and Risk-Averse Utility Function 
Several properties of loss-aversions are described as follows: 
l’(wo) <0: Increasing Loss-Aversion (ILA) means the newsvendor is more loss-
averse when she is wealthier.  An example of ILA is l(wo)=1-αwo where 
0<α<1/wo.  Notice that the wealth discount is increasing in wo. 
l’(wo) =0: Constant Loss-Aversion (CLA) means the newsvendor’s loss-aversion 
is independent of wo.  An example of CLA is l(wo)=α where 0<α<1. 
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l’(wo) >0: Decreasing Loss-Aversion (DLA) means the newsvendor is less loss-
averse when she is wealthier.  An example of DLA is l(wo)=αwo where 
0<α<1/wo.  
Next, we discuss the effect of wo on the newsvendor’s optimal order quantity 
under different combinations of absolute risk-aversion and loss-aversion.  Recall our 
previous discussion of how wo affects the optimal order quantity under various absolute 
risk aversions.  Consider a DARA newsvendor who fears loss in a manner described by 
DLA.  Given an increase in wealth, the DARA-DLA newsvendor’s risk-aversion and 
loss-aversion will decrease, and hence the optimal order quantity will increase.  By 
analogous arguments, we can summarize the effect of wo on qla* as follows: 
Table 3: Optimal Order Quantity of a Loss and Risk-Aversion Newsvendor 
Increase in wo IARA CARA DARA 
ILA qla* decreases qla * decreases Indeterminate 
CLA qla * decreases qla * unchanged qla * increases 
DLA Indeterminate qla * increases qla * increases 
 
 
The optimal order quantities for the cases of DARA-ILA and IARA-DLA are 
indeterminate due to conflicting interests of risk-aversion and loss-aversion.  Consider the 
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Observe that 0)(' <owl which implies an ILA.  Graphically we see that as wo 
increases the slope of utility function on the loss side increases (Figure 7).  Notice the 
following property of ILA: 
ula(w,woH) < ula(w,woL) for woH > woL and w < woH 
That is, the utility of a loss and risk-averse newsvendor with higher initial wealth is 
uniformly lower than the utility of a loss and risk-averse newsvendor with lower initial 
wealth after suffering a loss (w<wo).  An example is a person with an initial $1000 that 
lost $900 may be more discontent with the $100 in hand, than another person with an 
initial $200 that lost $100.  This would have caused the optimal order quantity to 
decrease as wo increases.  However, the decreasing absolute risk aversion for higher wo 
retards the decision maker’s inclination to decrease qla*. 







Figure 7: DARA-ILA Utility Function 
Similar arguments could be made for the case of IARA-DLA newsvendor.  Consider the 






















    (5) 
where oo wwl 2.0)( = and w<2.  Observe that 0)(' >owl , which implies a DLA.  
Graphically we see that as wo increases the slope of utility function on the loss side 
increases (Figure 8).  Notice the following property of DLA: 
ula(w,woH) > ula(w,woL) for woH > woL and w < woL. 
That is, the utility of wealth is uniformly higher over loss for higher wo.  The DLA 
property generally would have caused the optimal order quantity to increase as wo 
increases.  However, the increasing absolute risk aversion for higher wo retards the 
decision maker’s inclination to increase qla*. 
Increasing loss-
aversion over loss 
Declining risk-
aversion over gain 







Figure 8: IARA-DLA Utility Function 
The general characteristics of various loss-aversions are described by a side-by-
side comparison shown in Figure 9.  We utilized the constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) as the basis for this comparison.  Notice that under DLA the ula(w,woH) 
dominates ula(w,woL) over the loss region and ula(w,woL) dominates ula(w,woH) under ILA.  
Under the CLA, the degree of loss-aversion is independent of wo.   
 
Figure 9: CARA Utility Functions for Various Loss-Aversions 
CARA DLA CARA CLA CARA ILA
Increasing risk-
aversion over loss 
Declining loss-
aversion over gain 
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In conclusion, different levels of initial wealth impact the newsvendor’s optimal 
order quantities in different ways depending on her preference to risk and to loss.  
Empirical studies of newsvendor decision-making are presented in the following 
Chapters to highlight and discuss some of these seemingly contradictory results. 
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CHAPTER 4: MODELING HUMAN DECISION BIAS 
 
In this Chapter we present various newsvendor requisition policies that result in human 
decision bias.  We propose a multi-period newsvendor decision-making model of these 
newsvendor requisition policies to serve as a framework to investigate HDB.  Hypotheses 
and implications of this human decision bias (HDB) model are discussed.  Comparative 
static analyses of HDB further reveal interesting results consistent with existing 
newsvendor theories. 
4.1 Formulation of Human Decision Bias Model 
The purpose of the HDB model is to describe and to predict newsvendor decision-making 
that has been empirically proven to be inconsistent with any single utility theory such as 
risk-aversion, loss-aversion, and prospect theory (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000).  The 
investigators of NV decision bias conclude: 
 
(1) “Subjects behave as if their utility function incorporates a preference to reduce 
ex-post inventory error, the absolute difference between the chosen quantity 
and realized demand.” 
(2) “Subjects suffer from the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias.”  
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Figure 10: Newsvendor Decision Diagram 
Four NV procurement policies are derived from these results.  Conclusion (1) 
suggests that newsvendor decision-making to incorporate the procurement policy of 
ordering at the average demand level, which will minimize ex-post inventory error, into 
the classic NV profit maximizing solution.  Conclusion (2) introduces the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic, a decision process of anchoring at a reference point and then 
adjusting decision after receiving feedback from the system, similar to one used in a non-
perishable inventory setting (Sterman, 1989).  Some reasonable reference points for this 
procurement heuristic are decision-maker’s previous order quantity and the average 
demand.  Demand chasing heuristic, the preference to adjust towards the previous 
realization of demand, has also been proposed as a significant heuristic to explain 
newsvendor decision-making.  Figure 10 illustrates the NV decision-making as a 
weighted sum of the following NV procurement heuristics: 











p = Weights 
Average 
Demand, x1
∑ pixi  Next Order, qt 
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2.  The policy of ordering at profit maximizing economic order quantity (EOQ) 











cpFq 1* . 
3.  The policy of ordering at previous realization of demand level, Dt-1. 
4.  The policy of ordering the previous order quantity, qt-1. 
 
Formally expressed by the following multivariable linear equation: 
11
*
−− +++= tqtduet qpDpqpDpq     (1) 
where: 
qt : Order quantity at time t 
pe : Weight of decision-maker’s reliance on tD  
pu : Weight of decision-maker’s reliance on EOQ 
pd : Weight of decision-maker’s reliance on Dt-1 
pq : Weight of decision-maker’s reliance on qt-1  
D : Perceived expected value of demand 










cpFq 1*  
Dt : Realization of demand at time t. 
 
Hypotheses testing of HDB model parameters, the weights decision-makers put 
on different procurement heuristics, will prove the significance and the direction of 
procurement heuristics’ influence on newsvendor decision-making. 
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Hypothesis 5.1: Expected Demand Heuristic Hypothesis 
0:0 ≤epH  
0:1 >epH  
Hypothesis 5.1 is that the expected demand ordering policy will influence the 
newsvendor decision-making.  The expected demand policy is attractive to a decision-
maker who wants to minimize the number of overages and shortages.  Expected demand 
is often used in stochastic programming problems involving uncertainties in demand.  We 
would reject H0 if 1,0 −> ntt α and conclude with 1-α confidence that the expected demand 
heuristics significantly affects newsvendor decision. 
Hypothesis 5.2: EOQ Heuristic Hypothesis 
0:0 ≤upH  
0:1 >upH  
Hypothesis 5.2 is that the policy of ordering the quantity defined by EOQ will influence 
NV decision-making.  We would reject H0 if 1,0 −> ntt α .  If H0 is rejected, then we would 
conclude with 1-α confidence that decision-makers rely on the utility model solution to 
determine their next order quantities.   
The EOQ of the risk-neutral NV captures two influential factors on the NV 
optimal order quantity: the item profit margin and the demand distribution.  Comparative 
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static results of components of item profit margin such as the unit sale price, the unit cost, 
and the salvage value of the SPP are as follows: (1) if unit sale price goes up, ceteris 
paribus, the EOQ quantity will increase as well, and if unit sale price goes down, ceteris 
paribus, the EOQ quantity will decrease as well; (2) Higher unit cost of the newsvendor 
product leads to lower EOQ quantity and lower unit cost leads to higher EOQ quantity; (3) 
Higher salvage value generally leads to higher EOQ and lower salvage value leads to 





























Figure 11: Comparison of the EOQs of Different Types of Demand Distributions 
The changes in the mean, variance, and type of demand distribution affect the 
EOQ quantity differently.  A higher mean leads to a higher EOQ quantity and a lower 
mean leads to lower EOQ quantity, ceteris paribus.  A higher variance increases the EOQ 
quantity for high profit margin products and reduces the EOQ quantity of low profit 
margin products.  Changes in the type of demand distribution also affect the EOQ 
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quantity.  Comparison of 2 distributions with identical mean and variance (Figure 11) 
shows the EOQ quantities of a high profit margin item is higher when demand is 
uniformly distributed.  On the other hand, the EOQ quantity of a low profit margin item 
is lower when demand is uniformly distributed.   
 
Hypothesis 5.3: Demand Chasing Hypothesis 
0:0 ≤dpH  
0:1 >dpH  
Hypothesis 5.3 is that the demand chasing policy will influence the newsvendor decision-
making.  We reject H0 if 1,0 −> ntt α and conclude with 1-α confidence that newsvendor 
decision-making is influenced by demand chasing heuristic.   
Hypothesis 5.4: Previous Order Preference Hypothesis 
0:0 ≤qpH  
0:1 >qpH  
Hypothesis 5.4 is that the policy to order at the previous order quantity level will 
significantly influence NV decision-making.  We reject H0 if 1,0 −> ntt α and conclude with 
1-α confidence that newsvendor decision-making is influenced by the preference to 
anchor at the previous order quantity level. 
 36  
Hypothesis 5.5: HDB model completeness hypothesis 
1:0 =+++ qdue ppppH  
1:1 ≠+++ qdue ppppH  
Hypothesis 5.5 is that the HDB model is a weighted average of different newsvendor 
ordering policies.  We reject H0 if 1,0 −> ntt α and conclude with 1-α confidence that 
newsvendor decision-making can be treated as weighted average of four different 
ordering policies. 
Various empirical studies will be set up before and after a formal training session 
on SPP for newsvendor subjects to test these hypotheses in Chapter 5. 
4.2 Comparative Static Analyses of HDB Model 
This section discusses the significance of the decision-maker’s initial order quantity and 
the comparative static analysis of the effect of sale price, p, unit cost, c, and salvage value, 
s on the HDB model. 
Analysis of first order quantity 
The newsvendor’s first order quantity is important for two reasons.  First, if the previous 
order quantity preference hypothesis is significant, then the first order quantity will be an 
important reference for the decision-maker’s subsequent decisions.  Second, many 
perishable items such as fashion goods and Christmas ornaments are seasonal, and the 
retailer may only be able to place one order for the whole selling season.   
Let us expand the HDB model in terms of t as follows: 










































which can be rewritten as follows: 
1
1*22 )](1[ qpDpqpDppppq tqdue
t
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qt pS   (5) 










qtq pSp  (6) 
Subtracting (6) from (5) then gives 


































=  (8) 
 Since we would not have a previous order quantity for t = 1, (8) will only apply 
when t > 1.   
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, which is a decreasing function 
of t.  This implies that the influence of the first order quantity, q1 is greatest during the 
early periods of ordering.  Graphical representation of the convergence rate of 1−tqp  
(Figure 12) indicates that there are diminishing returns to the influence of the first order 
quantity for a small value of pq, and that the influence of first order quantity remains high 

























Figure 12: Effects of Initial Order Quantity 
For 10 <≤ qp  and ∞→t , the sum of (5) converges to
qp−1









=  (9) 
pq = 0.90 
pq = 0.50 
pq = 0.10 
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Since the term q1 has disappeared, the HDB model suggests that in the long run 
the first order quantity, q1 will not significantly affect the decision-maker’s order quantity.   
Comparative Static Analysis of the HDB 
The section discusses the comparative static analysis of the effects of different NV cost 
parameters on the HDB.  Specifically, we will investigate the impact of NV cost 
parameters in the long run HDB model under a uniform demand distribution assumption. 
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Since p>s, then (p-s)2>0.  The salvage value, s is assumed less than unit cost, c, 










, and so we conclude that 0>
dp
dqt , 
which implies that the unit price, p is positively correlated with the order quantity, qt. 
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dqt , which implies that the unit cost, c negatively 
influences the order quantity, qt.  Intuitively, when the cost of an item increases, ceteris 
paribus, the newsvendor’s order quantity will decrease. 

























































.  We therefore conclude that 0>
ds
dqt , which implies that unit salvage 
value, s positively influences the order quantity, qt.  Intuitively, when the salvage value of 
an item increases, the profit margin of the item also increases, ceteris paribus, the 
newsvendor’s order quantity will also increase. 
4.3 HDB Parameters Estimation Approach 
This section discusses the multivariable linear regression technique to estimate the 
significance of the HDB model parameters.   
We select the traditional frequentist parameter estimation approach instead of the 
more subjective Bayesian (Hines and Montgomery, 1990) approach for following reasons.  
(1) We would not to able to specify a satisfactory a priori distribution due to the fact that 
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we didn’t have any prior information on the probability distribution for different ordering 
policies;  (2) The factorial experimental designs we planned to check the significance of 
factors such as wealth, salvage value, and relationship between supplier and retailers rely 
on the frequentist approach.  The effect estimates of the 2k design are least squares 
estimates (LSD) (Montgomery, p.  549, 1997); and (3) Reasonably good estimates of the 
parameters of the HDB model with the LSE method can be obtained for a sufficient 
number of runs and subjects.   
The HDB model parameters need to be transformed into the following 
multivariable linear regression model: 
εββββ +++++= L3322110 xxxY   (12) 
This transformation is proposed because it is more difficult to evaluate the quality of the 
fitted HDB model in its present condition, a linear regression model with zero intercept.  
Myers (1990) shows that the coefficient of determination, R2, which is a measure of the 
fit of the regression line, may be inflated because the total sum of squares is not corrected 
for the mean for the zero intercept case. 
The HDB parameters can be expressed in a more general multivariate linear 
regression model (12) without the loss of generality.  First, the dependent variable Y can 
conveniently be replaced by qt.  Second, the intercept estimate, β0 can be replaced by 
Dpe .  The HDB model assumes zero intercept and i.i.d. demand distribution, so we can 
treat the expected demand term, Dpe  as the intercept term for the general multivariate 
 42  
linear regression model.  Third, the slopes and predictors variables β1x1, β2x2, and β3x3 
are replaced by pu q*, pd qD, and pq qt-1. 
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CHAPTER 5: SINGLE NEWSVENDOR EXPERIMENTS 
 
 
This Chapter presents the empirical results of two single newsvendor decision-making 
experiments.  These experiments are set up to test the hypotheses from previous two 
chapters.  The response variable for all experiments is the newsvendor’s order quantity.  
The independent variables for the first experiments are the newsvendor’s initial wealth 
and item profit margin.  The independent variables for the second experiments are item 
profit margin and item salvage value.   
5.1 Experiment I: Effects of NV Initial Wealth and Item Profit Margin 
This section presents empirical results of statistical analysis of the effects of 
newsvendor’s initial wealth and item profit margin on newsvendor (NV) decision-
making.  This empirical study extends current empirical studies of the NV problem which 
have only tested the significance of item profit margin (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000, 
Bolton and Katok, 2004).  Undergraduate student subjects from the School of Industrial 
and Systems Engineering at Georgia Tech were recruited to participate in this 
experiment.  These students were enrolled in a required undergraduate course that would 
teach the concept and the formulation of the classical newsvendor problem.  This group 
of students participated in this experiment before and after they learned the concept and 
formula of the NV problem. 
5.1.1 Experiment I Design and Protocols 
This 22 factorial design experiment has four treatment levels (Table 4).  The NV’s initial 
wealth factor has two levels.  Subjects under the low initial wealth (W-) condition are 
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informed to imagine they have $500 to invest and subjects under the high initial wealth 





−  has two levels.  The low profit margin (0.25) or high cost condition (C+) has a 
cost structure of p=$12, c = $9, and s = $0.  The high profit margin (0.75) or low cost 
condition (C-) has cost structure of p=$12, c = $3, and s = $0. 



























Each treatment level is replicated ten times.  The subjects are instructed to order 
in such a way that would maximize their final wealth.  The subjects are not informed of 
the length of the experiment and were told that it could end at any time.  The actual 
demand is randomly generated during the experiment. 
Detailed procedure: 
1. Each subject is provided with the consent form to participate in the experiment 
voluntarily and is informed that the subject can quit anytime during the 
experiment without penalty. 
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2. Upon receipt of consent form, the principal investigator will provide each subject 
with the past demand data. 
3. Subject is informed of the current wealth level and the current cost structure of the 
item. 
4. Subject is asked to place an order within the demand range. 
5. Subject places the order quantity. 
6. Subject receives information about the actual demand for that period and its 
resulting profit or loss. 
7. Subject reviews the demand data and current wealth. 
8. Subject repeats step 3 for 40 order periods (10 runs for each treatment). 
 
Of 26 subjects who participated in the experiment, only 24 subjects completed the 
experiments.  All subjects underwent the same procedure with the same set of demand 
data.  The experiment, conducted in May, 2004, was certified by the Georgia Institute of 
Technology Institute Review Board (IRB). 
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5.1.2 Experiment I Results and Analysis (Before Learning NV) 
This section presents the statistical analyses of the data collected from this experiment in 
five major categories: 
1. Factorial design experiment analyses. 
2. Analyses of mean and variance of NV order quantity. 
3. Analyses of NV order quantity adjustments over time and wealth. 
4. Analyses of NV performance in term of profits, shortages, and overages. 
5. Hypotheses testing of the HDB model. 
5.1.2.1 Factorial design experiment analyses 
This factorial experiment analysis investigates the significance of the NV’s initial wealth 
term and the item profit margin term on newsvendor order quantities before subjects 
receive formal training on NV problem.  The average order quantity of all subjects from 
each treatment level replication is compiled in such a way that each treatment condition 
has 10 data points.  Figure 13 presents the normal probability plot of residuals.  Other 
than some slight tail effects, the data appears normal. 
 




















Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals
(response is ALL)
 
Figure 13: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals 
Average order quantity 
This factorial design experiment is set up and analyzed in the MINITAB version 14 
software.  Figure 14 displays the effect estimates, the regression coefficients, and the sum 
of squares for each main effect and interaction terms.  For these subjects, this statistical 
analysis indicates the subject’s initial wealth, the item profit margin, and the interaction 
between these two factors to significantly affect human-determined newsvendor order 
quantity.  The estimated effects for the aggregate data set shows the initial wealth term 
had positive effect of 10.43 which means higher order quantity is selected by subjects at 
the high initial wealth level.  The estimated effects for the cost term is -56.28 which 
means the subjects in this experiment order less when the item cost is higher.   
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Estimated Effects and Coefficients for ALL (coded units) 
 
Term            Effect      Coef     SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                  129.92       1.571   82.68  0.000 
Wealth           10.43      5.22       1.571    3.32  0.002 
Cost            -56.28    -28.14       1.571  -17.91  0.000 
Wealth*Cost      15.68      7.84       1.571    4.99  0.000 
 
Analysis of Variance for ALL (coded units) 
 
Source                DF      Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS      F      P 
Main Effects           2     32762.0    32762.0    16381.0 165.86  0.000 
2-Way Interactions     1      2458.4     2458.4     2458.4  24.89  0.000 
Residual Error        36      3555.5     3555.5       98.8 
  Pure Error          36      3555.5     3555.5       98.8 
Total                 39     38775.9 
Figure 14: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Factorial Design Analysis and ANOVA Summary 
For these data, the cost and initial wealth interaction plot (Figure 15) shows that 
initial wealth effect is very small when the cost is low (C-) and very large when the cost 
is high (C+).  This interaction plot also shows that the cost effect is large when initial 
wealth is low or high.  Therefore, we can conclude that initial wealth effect affects the 
subjects’ NV decisions most when item cost is high and that the item profit margin effect 
affects the subjects’ NV decisions regardless of the levels of newsvendor’s initial wealth. 





















Figure 15: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Interaction Plots 
Individual order quantity 
This section investigates the percentage of NV subjects whose decision-making is 
influenced by either the item cost term or the initial wealth term.  The analysis results 
(Table 5) show that 87.5% of the subjects were influenced by at least one of the main 
factors.  The item profit margin and the initial wealth factors affected the decisions of 
83.3% and 37.5% of the subjects respectively.   
Table 5: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Summary of Percentage of Participants with 
Significant Factors 
Factor Significant Not Significant 
Cost 83.3% 16.7% 
Wealth 37.5% 62.5% 
Either one 87.5% 12.5% 
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5.1.2.2 Descriptive statistics of NV order quantity 
The analysis of decision-maker’s first order quantity enables us to make a 
comparison of treatment effects that is not confounded by the potential effects of 
experience and feedback.  For these subjects, the statistical results (Table 6) indicate that 
the first inventory orders by subjects who faced the low cost conditions was significantly 
higher than the high cost conditions ( t(23) = 5.17, p<0.001).  On average, the first 
inventory order of subjects who faced the high wealth conditions was significantly higher 
than those subjects with the low wealth conditions ( t(23) = 4.38, p<0.001).  On average, 
the first inventory orders of subjects who faced high cost condition were above the 
mathematically optimal expected profit maximizing order quantity of 75 ( t(23) = 3.22, 
p<0.005).  On average, the first inventory orders of subjects who faced low cost condition 
were below the mathematically expected profit maximizing order quantity of 225 ( t(23) 
= 9.19, p<0.001).  On average, the first inventory orders were below the expected 
demand of 150 under all conditions, but this difference was only significant for the high 
cost conditions ( t(23) = 10.41, p<0.001) and was not significant for the low cost 
conditions ( t(23) = 0.87, p = n.s.).   
Table 6: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Statistics of Initial Order Quantity 
Treatment Average Standard Deviation 
C-W+ 146.33 45.65 
C+W+ 123.54 36.76 
C+W- 61.88 30.49 
C-W- 138.04 59.63 
 
 
The results of the one sample t-test comparisons of the subject’s average order 
quantity and the expected demand (150) confirmed that order quantities of the subjects in 
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treatment conditions C-W- (t(239)=3.09, p-value < 0.005), C+W- (t(239)=-29.36  p-value 
<0.001), and C+W+ (t(239)=-11.19  p-value < 0.001) significantly deviated from the 
expected demand.  The order quantities under high cost (C+) conditions deviated most 
significantly from the expected demand (150).  The average order quantity in the high 
cost and low wealth (C+W-) condition was 41% less than the expected demand. 
The one sample t-test results indicate the subject’s order quantities under all four 
treatment conditions to exhibit significant deviation from their respective mathematically 
optimal profit maximizing EOQs.  On average, the average inventory orders of subjects 
who faced high cost conditions were above the expected profit maximizing EOQ of 75 
( t(479)= 13.55, p-value <0.0001).  On average, the average inventory orders of subjects 
who faced low cost conditions were below the expected profit maximizing EOQ of 225 
( t(479)= -28.04, p-value <0.0001).   
Variable          N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
C-W+            240    155.44     51.08      3.30 
C+W+            240    114.84     48.66      3.14 
C+W-            240     88.73     32.33      2.09 
C-W-            240    160.68     53.49      3.45 
 
Variable             95.0% CI      
C-W+          (  148.94,  161.93) 
C+W+          (  108.65,  121.03) 
C+W-          (   84.61,   92.84)  
C-W-          (  153.88,  167.49) 
Figure 16: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Confidence Intervals of Average Order Quantity 
The subjects’ average order quantities under the high cost high initial wealth 
(C+W+) condition of 114.84 units had a percentage deviation of 53.1% more than EOQ.  
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The average order quantities under low cost high initial wealth (C-W+) condition was 
69.56 units less than the profit maximizing EOQ of 225 units. 
Table 7 presents the variability in subjects’ order quantities under various 
treatment conditions.  The standard deviation of the subjects’ order quantities (55.64) was 
smaller than the standard deviation of the actual demand (77.69) or the theoretical 
standard deviation of the demand (75.0).  
Table 7: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Standard Deviation of NV Order Quantity 







The analysis of subjects ordering behavior as a function of wealth shows that the 
subjects’ preference is consistent with a utility model of a decreasing loss-aversion 
(DLA), a decreasing absolute risk-aversion (DARA) or a DARA-DLA newsvendor and is 
contradictory to the utility model of a risk-neutral, a risk-seeking, a CARA, a IARA, a 
ILA, or a CLA newsvendor.   
5.1.2.3 Adjustment of order quantity 
This section presents adjustment in newsvendor decision-making as a function of time, 
wealth, and demand.  The statistical analyses indicate subjects make significant 
adjustments to their order quantities as their wealth changes and as they gather more 
experience over time.   
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Adjustment over time 
For these subjects, the order quantity specified by the NV with low initial wealth (C+W-, 
2.84 units / period, p-value <0.05 and C-W-, 2.46 units / period, p-value<0.05) shows a 
significant increasing trend over time (Figure 17).  The order quantity specified by the 
NV with high initial wealth (C-W+ and C+W+) does not exhibit any significant trend. 




















Figure 17: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Average Order Quantity vs.  Order Period 
Adjustment over changes in wealth 
This section investigates NV decision-making as wealth changes.  The plots of the order 
quantity versus wealth under each treatment condition (Figure 18) suggest the significant 
correlation between the subjects’ order quantity and subjects’ wealth.  Regression 
analysis results confirmed that changes in subjects’ wealth affected their order quantities 
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under the high cost high wealth condition (C+W+ with p-value < 0.001 and R2 = 26.9%).  
No other significant trend was found. 
 
Figure 18: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Order Quantities vs.  Wealth 
The NV decision bias resulted in losses for the subjects in C+W+ condition.  The 
expected profit graph (Figure 19) indicates that subjects under high cost (C+) condition 
are more likely to suffer lose due to deviation from the EOQ (75 units).  The average 
initial order quantity of subjects under C+W+ condition was 123.54 units, which had 
about 30% chance of loss.  Interestingly, the C+W+ Order Quantity vs. Wealth graph 
(Figure 18) suggests that C+W+ subjects tended to order even more after suffering losses 
(w < 10000).  By increasing the order quantities further away from the EOQ of the low 
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profit item (75 units), subjects are more likely to suffer greater losses.  The evidence 
suggests that newsvendors, after suffering losses, are more likely to engage in a more 
risky investment to make up for the loss.  This risk-seeking after loss behavior of subjects 
under C+W+ condition is consistent with the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) which predicts risk-seeking preference over loss and risk-aversion preference over 
gain. 

















Figure 19: Expected Profit against Order Quantity 
Low Profit Margin 
High Profit Margin 
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Adjustment towards demand 
This section presents the analysis of the demand changing heuristics; the tendency to 
adjust order quantity towards the demand from the previous period.  Let the order at 













and 3 types of adjustments as follows: 
1. No change from the previous period’s order quantity where at = 0 
2. Adjustment towards the previous period’s demand where at > 0 
3. Adjustment away from the previous period’s demand where at < 0 
The total number of order periods (10) under each treatment condition is divided 
into three time segments and each segment consists of three ordering periods.  Segment 1 
consists of orders for periods 2-4, segment 2 consists of orders for periods 5-7, and 
segment 3 consists of orders for periods 8-10.   
Table 8 presents the results of order adjustment analysis over all treatment 
conditions.  Experiment subjects were more likely to change their order quantities in the 
early periods than in the later periods, especially under the low cost high wealth, and high 
cost low wealth conditions.  These subjects are 2.1 times more likely to adjust their order 
quantity towards the direction of the previous period’s demand than away from the 
previous demand (p-value <0.001).  Correlation between qt-qt-1 and qt-Dt-1 is significant 
(r=0.409, p-value < 0.05).  This correlation test rejects the hypothesis that adjustment in 
order quantity is not correlated with the difference between previous demand and 
previous order quantity.  Further, 45.8% of individual subjects showed significant 
demand chasing heuristics.   
 57  
Table 8: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Order Quantity Adjustments Summary 
C-W+ C+W+ 
Period No Change Toward Away Period No Change Toward Away 
2 – 4 27.8% 40.3% 31.9% 2 - 4 47.2% 43.1% 9.7% 
5 – 7 38.9% 44.4% 16.7% 5 - 7 48.6% 26.4% 25.0% 
8 – 10 50.0% 27.8% 22.2% 8 - 10 41.7% 31.9% 26.4% 
C+W- C-W+ 
Period No Change Toward Away Period No Change Toward Away 
2 – 4 38.9% 52.8% 8.3% 2 - 4 50.0% 34.7% 15.3% 
5 – 7 55.6% 33.3% 11.1% 5 - 7 51.4% 34.7% 13.9% 
8 – 10 55.6% 36.1% 8.3% 8 - 10 45.8% 34.7% 19.4% 
 
Overall 
Period No Change Toward Away 
2 - 4 41.0% 42.7% 16.3% 
5 - 7 48.6% 34.7% 16.7% 
8 - 10 48.3% 32.6% 19.1% 
All 45.9% 36.7% 17.4% 
 
5.1.2.4 Newsvendor performance matrix 
This section discusses the impact of human decision bias on the total NV profit, 
shortages, and overages. 
Table 9: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Average Profit or Loss Summary Result 




C-W+ 7,887.88 (108.23)   8,502.00 -7%1 
C+W+ -407.88 (322.01)   1,026.00 -140%1 
C+W- 1,186.25 (108.3)   1,674.00 -29%1 
C-W- 8,658.00 (222.37)   9,750.00 -11%1 
Overall 17,324.25 (395.3) 20,952.00 -17%1 
(1 significant with p-value<0.001) 
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Table 9 presents the analysis of NV subject’s total profit.  The average profit of 
all the subjects in this NV experiment was 17% below the EOQ procurement policy 
(t(23)=-9.18, p-value < 0.001).  In the case of low profit margin high initial wealth 
(C+W+), the NV subjects actually lost money on average due to high decision bias.  Even 
the maximum individual newsvendor profit was less than EOQ profit.  This result is 
consistent with the fact that the EOQ procurement policy outperforms any other ordering 
policy in the long run.   
Table 10 summarizes the shortage and overage of the newsvendor product.  For 
these subjects, the two-sample t test results indicate no significant difference between the 
EOQ policy and the empirical data in terms of overage and shortage per order (p-value 
>0.19).  The average number of units short (39.98) was not significantly different from 
the average number of units over (35.90) (p-value >0.20) and the difference between the 
shortage and the overage in the EOQ policy is also insignificant (p-value >0.25).  Under 
the high profit margin (C-) conditions the average number of units over is significantly 
greater than the average number of units short.  Under the low profit margin low wealth 
(C+W-) condition the average number of units short is more than 5 times greater than the 
average number of units over.  This result is reasonable because the subjects in this 
experiment tend to order more under low cost (C-) condition than in the high cost (C+) 
condition. 
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Table 10: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Unit Shortage and Overage Summary Result 
 Units Short Per Order (Standard Error) 
Units Over Per Order 
(Standard Error) 
ALL 39.98 (2.27) 35.90 (2.63) 
C-W+ 34.41 (3.50) 50.85 (6.57) 
C+W+ 34.47 (3.80) 32.11 (4.73) 
C+W- 62.47 (2.78) 12.30 (4.88) 
C-W- 28.58 (5.50) 48.36 (4.36) 
 
5.1.2.5 Human Decision Bias regression analysis of aggregate order quantities 
This section presents a regression analysis of Human Decision Bias (HDB) model fitted 
with the aggregate data of this single newsvendor experiment (Table 11).  This approach 
allows us to estimate the magnitude of the effects of different ordering policies in the 
HDB model:  
11
*
−− +++= tqtduet qpDpqpDpq  
The first order quantity under each treatment condition was omitted because HDB model 
is not applicable for t=1.   
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Table 11: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) HDB Regression Model Input Data 
Order EOQ d(t-1) q(t-1) 
141.21 225 73 146.33 
146.92 225 37 141.21 
169.75 225 291 146.92 
164.5 225 267 169.75 
163.88 225 122 164.5 
152.88 225 69 163.88 
161.46 225 102 152.88 
147.33 225 80 161.46 
160.13 225 113 147.33 
108.38 75 58 123.54 
113.79 75 253 108.38 
104.58 75 64 113.79 
127.75 75 32 104.58 
122.21 75 144 127.75 
108.83 75 118 122.21 
112.67 75 44 108.83 
119.92 75 176 112.67 
106.71 75 141 119.92 
80.042 75 116 61.875 
82.375 75 60 80.042 
95.125 75 265 82.375 
93.125 75 220 95.125 
101.417 75 237 93.125 
89.875 75 68 101.417 
91.375 75 87 89.875 
90.333 75 49 91.375 
101.708 75 158 90.333 
157.625 225 179 138.042 
160.167 225 94 157.625 
160.167 225 173 160.167 
165.958 225 160 160.167 
163.667 225 99 165.958 
157.875 225 12 163.667 
158.458 225 24 157.875 
167.667 225 259 158.458 
177.208 225 216 167.667 
 
 The HDB model is transformed into a general multivariate linear regression 
model without loss of generality and is fitted with the empirical data from this 
experiment.  Least square regression gives the best fit HDB model as: 
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11
* 558.00442.0173.0184.0 −− +++= ttt qDqDq    (1) 
Regression model checking 
Prior to drawing any conclusions from the regression analysis, some standard 
















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Order
 
Figure 20: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Residual Plots of HDB Regression Model 
The normality assumption in the linear regression model is important because the 
parametric tests of hypotheses are robust so long as the distribution of the dependent 
variable, Y does not depart extremely from normality (Kleinbaum and Kupper 1978).  
Figure 20 presents a normal probability plot of residuals and a plot of the residual versus 
the fitted values.  These plots appear satisfactory. 
 62  
Predictor     Coef  SE Coef     T      P 
Constant    27.532    8.073  3.41  0.002 
EOQ        0.17283  0.03975  4.35  0.000 
d(t-1)     0.04419  0.01681  2.63  0.013 
q(t-1)     0.55830  0.09659  5.78  0.000 
 
S = 7.88796   R-Sq = 94.1%   R-Sq(adj) = 93.5% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF     SS     MS       F      P 
Regression       3  31710  10570  169.88  0.000 
Residual Error  32   1991     62 
Total           35  33701 
 
Source  DF  Seq SS 
EOQ      1   29277 
d(t-1)   1     354 
q(t-1)   1    2079 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.07538 
  
No evidence of lack of fit (P >= 0.1). 
Figure 21: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Regression Analysis of HDB Model 
Another fundamental assumption in the linear regression model is that the error 
term, ε  has zero mean, constant variance, and is not correlated.  However, time series 
data such as our empirical data often violates the correlation assumption.  The error terms 
in time series data often exhibit serial correlation and such error terms are said to be auto-
correlated (Montgomery and Peck 1982).  Using the standard autocorrelation test 
developed by Durbin and Watson (1950, 1951, and 1971) we reject the hypothesis that 
our empirical data exhibited autocorrelation because the Durbin-Watson statistic of 
2.075, as indicated in Figure 21, is greater than the critical value for four predictors and a 
40 sample size set, dU(4,40,0.05) of 1.74.  The absence of autocorrelation allows 
application of t and F hypotheses tests for the significance of predictors, thus enabling the 
validation of hypotheses stated in previous chapters.   
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Finally, we will check the strength of the linear relationship between the 
dependant variable and the predictors and the appropriateness of a linear model.  The 
square of the sample correlation coefficient, r, is often used to measure the strength of 
linear relationship between Y and its predictors in general linear regression model.  We 
have a high R2 value of 93.5% (Figure 21) which suggests that a large portion of variation 
in the model is explained by the model predictors.  The lack of fit test is used to test for 
the appropriateness of a linear model.  Our lack of fit test result (Figure 21) shows no 
evidence of significant lack of fit (p>=0.1).  We therefore conclude that adding additional 
terms to the model may not be necessary to adequately explain the variation, and that a 
linear model is appropriate to describe the relationship between the newsvendor order 
quantity and these four ordering policies based on available data. 
HDB hypotheses testing 
The HDB model is a weighted sum of four independent NV procurement policies 
whose significance in the context of single NV prior to NV training is tested here.  For 
these subjects, the hypotheses tests results confirm the significance of some NV 
procurement policies and disapprove the significance of others.   
HDB model regression analysis results in Figure 21 show that the predictor, D has 
a coefficient of 0.18355 ( ep̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 3.41.  Since the value of 35,05.0t = 
1.69, we have 35,2/0 αtt > .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of the expected 
demand hypothesis (5.1) which states 
0:0 ≤epH  
0:1 >epH  
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and conclude with a 90% confidence level that the subjects used the expected demand 
policy to determine their order quantities. 
HDB model regression analysis results in Figure 21 show that the predictor, EOQ 
has a coefficient of 0.17284 ( up̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 4.35.  Since the value of 
35,05.0t = 1.69, we have 35,2/0 αtt > .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of the utility 
model policy hypothesis (5.2) which states 
0:0 ≤upH  
0:1 >upH  
and conclude with a 90% confidence level that the subjects used the utility model policy 
to determine their order quantities. 
HDB model regression analysis results in Figure 21 show that the predictor, Dt-1 
has a coefficient of 0.04419 ( dp̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 2.63.  Since the value of 
35,05.0t = 1.69, we have 35,2/0 αtt > .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of the demand 
chasing hypothesis (5.3) which states 
0:0 ≤dpH  
0:1 >dpH  
and conclude with a 90% confidence level that the subjects adjusted their order quantities 
toward the previous period’s demand. 
HDB model regression analysis results in Figure 21 show that the predictor, qt-1 
has a coefficient of 0.55829 ( qp̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 5.78.  Since the value of 
35,05.0t = 1.69, we have 35,2/0 αtt > .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of the demand 
chasing hypothesis (5.4) which states 
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0:0 ≤qpH  
0:1 >qpH  
and conclude with a 90% confidence level that the subjects anchored their order quantity 
on the previous period’s order quantity. 
Table 12: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) Individual Subject HDB Fit Summary Results 
Subject pe pu pd pq sum 
1 0.264 0.243 -0.0807 0.48 0.9063 
2 0.43 0.568 -0.156 0.003 0.845 
3 0.253 0.286 0.126 0.171 0.836 
4 0.429 0.0349 -0.0144 0.507 0.9565 
5 0.592 0.167 0.137 0.038 0.934 
6 0.383 0.209 -0.032 0.451 1.011 
7 0.413 0.172 -0.194 0.652 1.043 
8 0.173 0.15 0.191 0.375 0.889 
9 0.127 0.172 0.23 0.393 0.922 
10 0.34 0.171 0.224 0.292 1.027 
11 0.404 0.246 0.114 -0.091 0.673 
12 0.119 0.243 0.132 0.474 0.968 
13 0.423 0.0742 0.0569 0.163 0.7171 
14 0.536 0.0623 0.0699 0.133 0.8012 
15 0.303 0.113 0.225 0.182 0.823 
16 0.238 0.106 0.105 0.524 0.973 
17 0.417 0.429 -0.226 0.187 0.807 
18 0.273 0.0217 -0.0737 0.75 0.971 
19 0.625 0.181 0.053 0.332 1.191 
20 0.295 0.283 -0.174 0.436 0.84 
21 -0.0751 0.446 0.0683 0.492 0.9312 
22 -0.048 0.252 0.21 0.519 0.933 
23 0.0168 0.167 0.0441 0.725 0.9529 
24 0.0447 0.589 0.0348 0.246 0.9145 
Average 0.290642 0.224421 0.044592 0.351417 0.911071 
 
 
Table 12 presents the HDB parameter estimates of individual subject.  It is 
interesting that almost all the coefficients are positive, which means that the order 
quantity of most subjects is affected in a similar manner.  For example, the coefficients of 
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pu are positive for all 24 subjects, which means all subjects increase their order quantities 
when under the condition of higher profit margin. 
The HDB model completeness hypothesis which states: 
1:0 =+++ qdue ppppH  
1:1 ≠+++ qdue ppppH  
tests if sum of the coefficients in the HDB model equals to 1, implying individual 
subject’s order quantity is a weighted average of four ordering policies.  A one sample t-
test result (Figure 22) rejects the null hypothesis and we conclude with 95% confidence 
level that the sum of coefficient for the HDB model prior to learning NV does not equal 
to 1. This result indicates that the subjects’ order quantity is not a weighted average of the 
four alternative NV requisition policies in the HDB model. 
Test of mu = 1 vs not = 1 
 
N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean         95% CI             T      P 
24  0.911071  0.109493  0.022350  (0.864836, 0.957305)  -3.98  0.001 
Figure 22: Exp. I (Before Learning NV) t-test on Sum of Coefficients of HDB Model 
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5.1.3 Experiment I Results and Analysis (Post Learning NV) 
This Section presents the statistical analyses of Experiment I after student subjects 
received formal training in NV problem. 
Students showed understanding of the NV problem after going through classroom 
NV problem training.  Students were assigned non trivial NV problem exercises over a 
span of 2 weeks to practice mathematical solution of the theoretical newsvendor problem.  
Various discrete and continuous demand distributions and NV cost structures were 
included in these exercises.  The results of these exercises were mostly satisfactory.  
According to the teaching assistant, 90% of students scored perfect in these exercises and 
the remaining 10% made a few calculation mistakes during problem solution.  
Experiment I was conducted one week after the last class learning exercise on 
newsvendor problem was conducted.  We recruited 22 subjects from previous round to 
repeat in the same NV experiment.  We present the statistical analyses of the data 
collected from this experiment in five major categories: 
1. Factorial design experiment analyses. 
2. Analyses of mean and variance of NV order quantity. 
3. Analyses of NV order quantity adjustments over time and wealth. 
4. Analyses of NV performance in term of profits, shortages, and overages. 
5. Hypotheses testing of the HDB model. 
5.1.3.1 Factorial design experiment analyses 
This factorial experiment analysis investigates the significance of the NV’s initial wealth 
term and the item profit margin term on newsvendor order quantities after subjects 
receive a formal training on NV problem.  The average order quantity of all subjects from 
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each treatment level replication was compiled in such a way that each treatment condition 
has 10 data points.  Figure 23 presents the normal probability plot of residuals.  Other 

















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for ALL
 
Figure 23: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals 
Average order quantity 
This factorial design experiment is set up and analyzed in the MINITAB version 14 
software.  Figure 24 displays the effect estimates, the regression coefficients, and the sum 
of squares for each main effect and interaction terms.  For these subjects, this statistical 
analysis indicates the initial wealth, the item profit margin, and the interaction between 
these 2 factors to significantly affect newsvendor order quantity.  The estimated effects 
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for the aggregate data set shows the initial wealth term had positive effect of 4.90 which 
means higher order quantity is achieved at the high initial wealth level.  The estimated 
effects for the cost term is -43.16 which means the decision-makers ordered less under 
higher cost conditions than under lower cost conditions.   
Estimated Effects and Coefficients for ALL (coded units) 
 
Term         Effect    Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant             156.97    1.379  113.85  0.000 
Wealth         4.90    2.45    1.379    1.78  0.084 
Cost         -43.16  -21.58    1.379  -15.65  0.000 
Wealth*Cost    6.05    3.02    1.379    2.19  0.035 
 
Analysis of Variance for ALL (coded units) 
 
Source              DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS       F      P 
Main Effects         2  18870.6  18870.6  9435.32  124.10  0.000 
2-Way Interactions   1    365.5    365.5   365.48    4.81  0.035 
Residual Error      36   2737.2   2737.2    76.03 
  Pure Error        36   2737.2   2737.2    76.03 
Total               39  21973.3 
Figure 24: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Factorial Design Analysis and ANOVA Summary 
For these data, the cost and initial wealth interaction plot (Figure 25) shows that 
initial wealth effect is very small when the cost is low (C-) and very large when the cost 
is high (C+).  This interaction plot also shows that the cost effect is large when initial 
wealth is low or high.  Therefore, we can conclude that initial wealth effect affects 
newsvendor decision-making most when item cost is high and that the item profit margin 
effect affects newsvendor decision-making regardless of the levels of newsvendor’s 
initial wealth. 



















Figure 25: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Interaction Plots 
Individual order quantity 
This section investigates the percentage of NV subjects whose decision-making is 
influenced by either the item cost term or the initial wealth term.  The analysis results 
(Table 13) show that 83.36% of the subjects were influenced by at least one of the main 
factors.  The item profit margin and the initial wealth factors affected the decisions of 
77.27% and 45.45% of the subjects respectively.   
Table 13: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Summary of Percentage of Participants with 
Significant Factors 
Factor Significant Not Significant 
Cost 77.27% 22.73% 
Wealth 45.45% 54.55% 
Either one 86.36% 13.64% 
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5.1.3.2 Descriptive statistics of NV order quantity 
The results of the one sample t-test comparisons of the average order quantity and 
the expected demand (150) confirmed that order quantities in treatment conditions C-W- 
(t(219)=8.60, p-value < 0.001), C-W+ (t(219)=8.92, p-value < 0.001), C+W- (t(219)=-
4.93  p-value <0.001), and C+W+ (t(219)=-2.66  p-value < 0.01) significantly deviated 
from the expected demand.  The order quantities under low cost (C-) conditions deviated 
most significantly from the expected demand (150).   
For these subjects, the one sample t-test results indicate the order quantities under 
all four treatment conditions exhibit significant deviation from their respective profit 
maximizing EOQs.  On average, the average inventory orders of subjects who faced high 
cost conditions were above the expected profit maximizing order quantity of 75; C+W- 
(t(219)=13.47  p-value <0.001), and C+W+ (t(219)=19.19  p-value < 0.01).  On average, 
the average inventory orders of subjects who faced low cost conditions were below the 
expected profit maximizing order quantity of 225; C-W- (t(219)=-13.54, p-value < 0.001) 
and C-W+ (t(219)=-14.99, p-value < 0.001). 
The average order quantities under the high cost high initial wealth (C+W+) 
condition of 114.84 units had a percentage deviation of 87.8% more than EOQ.  The 
average order quantities under low cost high initial wealth (C-W+) condition was 47.02 
units less than the profit maximizing EOQ of 225 units. 
Table 14 presents the variability in decision-makers’ order quantities under 
various treatment conditions.  The standard deviation of the subjects’ order quantities 
(55.64) was smaller than the standard deviation of the actual demand (77.69) or the 
theoretical standard deviation of the demand (75.0).  This result seems to contradict the 
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commonly known Bullwhip Effect in inventory systems, where variation is amplified 
upstream in a supply chain.  This topic will be further discussed more in the multi-
echelon NV setting later. 
Table 14: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Standard Deviation of NV Order Quantity 
Treatment 
Conditions 








The analysis of subjects ordering behavior as a function of wealth shows that the 
subjects’ preference is consistent with a utility model of a decreasing loss-aversion 
(DLA), a decreasing absolute risk-aversion (DARA) or a DARA-DLA newsvendor and is 
contradictory to the utility model of a risk-neutral, a risk-seeking, a CARA, a IARA, a 
ILA, or a CLA newsvendor.   
5.1.3.3 Adjustment of order quantity 
This Section presents adjustment in newsvendor decision-making as a function of time, 
wealth, and demand.  The statistical analyses indicate subjects make significant 
adjustments to their order quantities as their wealth changes and as they gather more 
experience over time.   
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Adjustment over time 
The order quantity of the newsvendor in low profit margin (C+W-, 3.32 units / period, p-
value <0.005 and C+W+, 2.52 units / period, p-value<0.01) shows a significant 
increasing trend over time (Figure 26).  The order quantity of the newsvendor in high 
profit margin conditions (C-W+ and C-W-) does not exhibit any significant trend. 




















Figure 26: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Average Order Quantity vs.  Order Period 
Adjustment over changes in wealth 
This section investigates NV decision-making as wealth changes.  The plots of the order 
quantity versus wealth under each treatment condition (Figure 27) suggest the significant 
correlation between the order quantity and wealth.  Regression analysis results confirmed 
that changes in subjects’ wealth affected their order quantities under the high cost high 
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initial wealth condition (C+W+ with p-value < 0.001 and R2 = 32.2%) and under the low 
cost low initial wealth condition (C-W- with p-value < 0.05 and R2 = 22.9%).  No other 
significant trend was found. 
 
Figure 27: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Order Quantities vs.  Wealth 
The newsvendor decision bias caused the subjects in C+W+ condition to lose 
money.  The probability of loss versus order quantity graph (Figure 28) indicates that 
subjects under high cost (C+) condition are more likely to suffer loss due to deviation 
from the EOQ (75 units).  The average initial order quantity of subjects under C+W+ 
condition was 140.86 units, which had about 35% chance of loss.  Interestingly, the 
C+W+ Order Quantity vs. Wealth graph (Figure 27) suggests that C+W+ subjects tended 
to order even more after suffering losses (w < 10000).  The evidence would suggest that 
newsvendors, after suffering losses, are more likely to engage in a more risky investment 
to make up for the loss.  This ordering behavior of subjects under C+W+ condition is 
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consistent with the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) which predicts risk-
seeking preference over loss and risk-aversion preference over gain. 

















Figure 28: Probability of Loss against Order Quantity 
Adjustment towards demand 
This section presents our analysis of the demand changing heuristics; the tendency to 
adjust order quantity towards the demand from the previous period.  Table 15 presents 
the results of order adjustment analysis over all treatment conditions.  Decision-makers 
were more equally likely to change the order quantity in the early periods and in the later 
periods.  Decision-makers are 2.37 times more likely to adjust their order quantity 
towards the direction of the previous period’s demand than away from the previous 
High Cost (C+) 
Low Cost (C-) 
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demand (p-value <0.001).  Correlation between qt-qt-1 and qt-Dt-1 is not significant 
(r=0.266, p-value = 0.266).  This correlation test fails to reject the hypothesis that 
adjustment in order quantity is not correlated with the difference between previous 
demand and previous order quantity.  Further, 45.5% of individual subjects showed 
significant demand chasing heuristics.   
 
Table 15: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Order Quantity Adjustments Summary 
C-W+ C+W+ 
C-W+ No Change Toward Away C+W+ No Change Toward Away 
2 - 4 51.5% 34.8% 13.6% 2 - 4 36.4% 43.9% 19.7% 
5 - 7 42.4% 39.4% 18.2% 5 - 7 39.4% 47.0% 13.6% 
8 - 10 43.9% 40.9% 15.2% 8 - 10 40.9% 39.4% 19.7% 
C+W- C-W+ 
Period No Change Toward Away Period No Change Toward Away 
2 - 4 45.5% 37.9% 16.7% 2 - 4 39.4% 37.9% 22.7% 
5 - 7 45.5% 37.9% 16.7% 5 - 7 50.0% 36.4% 13.6% 
8 - 10 40.9% 42.4% 16.7% 8 - 10 45.5% 39.4% 15.2% 
 
Overall 
Period No Change Toward Away 
2 - 4 41.0% 42.7% 16.3% 
5 - 7 48.6% 34.7% 16.7% 
8 - 10 48.3% 32.6% 19.1% 
All 45.9% 36.7% 17.4% 
 
5.1.3.4 Newsvendor performance matrix 
This section discusses the impact of human decision bias on the total NV profit, 
shortages, and overages. 
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Table 16: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Average Profit or Loss Summary Result 






C-W+  10,625.59 (181.4)  11,274.00  -6%1 
C+W+   -1,193.32 (288.8)       702.00  -270%1 
C+W-   -1,396.64 (552.0)       534.00  -362%1 
C-W-    7,576.91 (137.4)    7,674.00  -1% 
Overall  15,612.55 (865.5)  20,184.00  -23%1 
 (1 significant with p-value<0.005) 
Table 16 presents the analysis of newsvendor profit.  The average profit of all the 
decision-makers in this NV experiment was 23% below the EOQ procurement policy 
(t(21)=-5.28, p-value < 0.001).  In the case of low profit margin (C+W-,C+W+), the 
decision-makers actually lost money on average due to high decision bias.  Unlike the 
results from previous round, one subject with profit of $20,422 actually outperformed the 
EOQ policy and another subject followed EOQ policy exactly.   
Table 17 summarizes the shortage and overage of the newsvendor product.  The 
two-sample t test results indicate no significant difference between the EOQ policy and 
the empirical data in terms of the overage per order or the shortage per order (p-value 
>0.53).  The average number of units short (32.56) were significantly less than the 
average number of units over (51.35) (p-value < 0.001), while the difference between the 
shortage and the overage in the EOQ policy is insignificant (p-value >0.45).  Under the 
high profit margin (C-) conditions the average number of units over is significantly 
greater than the average number of units short.  Under the low profit margin low wealth 
(C-W-) condition the average number of units over is more than 5 times greater than the 
average number of units short.   
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Table 17: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Unit Shortage and Overage Summary Result 
 Units Short Per Order (Standard Error) 
Units Over Per Order 
(Standard Error) 
ALL 32.56 (2.62) 51.35 (3.01) 
C-W+ 24.06 (4.35) 44.94 (5.30) 
C+W+ 52.90 (5.42) 45.16 (5.71) 
C+W- 41.00 (6.24) 44.12 (3.69) 
C-W- 12.28 (2.62) 71.20 (3.01) 
 
5.1.3.5 HDB regression analysis of aggregate order quantities 
This Section presents a regression analysis of HDB model fitted with the aggregate data 
of this single newsvendor experiment (Table 18).  This approach allows us to estimate the 
magnitude of the effects of different ordering policies in the HDB model:  
11
*
−− +++= tqtduet qpDpqpDpq  
The first order quantity under each treatment condition was omitted because HDB model 
is not applicable for t=1. 
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Table 18: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) HDB Regression Model Input Data 
Order EOQ d(t-1) q(t-1) 
176.636 225 94 188.682 
180.273 225 183 176.636 
171.864 225 116 180.273 
172.773 225 41 171.864 
184.136 225 211 172.773 
180.727 225 294 184.136 
174.682 225 162 180.727 
176.182 225 102 174.682 
173.818 225 213 176.182 
129.773 75 37 127.182 
139.273 75 288 129.773 
142.455 75 213 139.273 
145.273 75 253 142.455 
133.227 75 126 145.273 
145.364 75 285 133.227 
137.909 75 129 145.364 
147.545 75 28 137.909 
160.591 75 96 147.545 
118.5 75 94 107.955 
125.909 75 218 118.5 
126.591 75 193 125.909 
138.727 75 101 126.591 
122.409 75 6 138.727 
136.636 75 107 122.409 
139.409 75 196 136.636 
140.227 75 19 139.409 
142.818 75 57 140.227 
172.636 225 201 186.5 
168.545 225 203 172.636 
186.136 225 47 168.545 
185.182 225 32 186.136 
182.864 225 166 185.182 
186.091 225 196 182.864 
177 225 57 186.091 
174.591 225 158 177 
171.727 225 108 174.591 
 
 The HDB model is transformed into a general multivariate linear regression 
model without loss of generality and is fitted with the empirical data from this 
experiment.  Least square regression gives the best fit HDB model as: 
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11
* 504.00097.0114.0401.0 −− +++= ttt qDqDq    (2) 
Regression model checking 
Prior to drawing any conclusions from the regression analysis, some standard 
















































Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Fitted Values
Histogram of the Residuals Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
Residual Plots for Order
 
Figure 29: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Residual Plots of HDB Regression Model 
The normality assumption in the linear regression model is important because the 
parametric tests of hypotheses are robust so long as the distribution of the dependent 
variable, Y does not depart extremely from normality (Kleinbaum and Kupper 1978).  
Figure 29 presents a normal probability plot of residuals and a plot of the residual versus 
the fitted values.  These plots appear satisfactory. 
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Predictor     Coef  SE Coef     T      P 
Constant     60.14    16.10  3.74  0.001 
EOQ        0.11399  0.04592  2.48  0.018 
d(t-1)     0.00968  0.01474  0.66  0.516 
q(t-1)      0.5043   0.1417  3.56  0.001 
 
S = 7.10271   R-Sq = 90.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 89.5% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS      MS       F      P 
Regression       3  15182.9  5061.0  100.32  0.000 
Residual Error  32   1614.4    50.4 
Total           35  16797.2 
 
Source  DF   Seq SS 
EOQ      1  14529.4 
d(t-1)   1     14.3 
q(t-1)   1    639.2 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.31707 
  
No evidence of lack of fit (P >= 0.1). 
Figure 30: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Regression Analysis of HDB Model 
Another fundamental assumption in the linear regression model is that the error 
term, ε  has zero mean, constant variance, and is not correlated.  However, time series 
data such as our empirical data often violates the correlation assumption.  The error terms 
in time series data often exhibit serial correlation and such error terms are said to be auto-
correlated (Montgomery and Peck 1982).  Using the standard autocorrelation test 
developed by Durbin and Watson (1950, 1951, and 1971) we reject the hypothesis that 
our empirical data exhibited autocorrelation because the Durbin-Watson statistic of 
2.317, as indicated in Figure 30, is greater than the critical value for 4 predictors and 40 
sample set, dU(4,40,0.05) of 1.74.  The absence of autocorrelation permitted the used of t 
and F statistics to test the significance of predictors, thus enabling the validation of 
hypotheses stated in previous chapters.   
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Finally, we will check the strength of linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and the predictors and the appropriateness of a linear model.  The square of the 
sample correlation coefficient, r, is often used to measure the strength of linear 
relationship between Y and its predictors in general linear regression model.  We have a 
high R2 value of 90.4% (Figure 30) which suggests that most variation in the model is 
explained by the model predictors.  The lack of fit test is used to test for the 
appropriateness of a linear model.  Our lack of fit test result (Figure 30) shows no evident 
of significant lack of fit (p>=0.1).  We therefore conclude that adding additional terms to 
the model is not really necessary, and that a linear model is appropriate to describe the 
relationship between the newsvendor order quantity and these four ordering policies 
based on available data. 
HDB hypotheses testing 
The HDB model is a weighted sum of four independent NV procurement policies 
whose significance in the context of single NV prior to NV training is tested here.  
Hypotheses tests results will confirm the significance of some NV procurement policies 
and disapprove the significance of others.   
HDB model regression analysis result in Figure 30 shows that the predictor, D has 
a coefficient of 0.401 ( ep̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 3.74.  Since the value of 35,05.0t = 
1.69, so we have 35,2/0 αtt > .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of the expected 
demand hypothesis (5.1) which states 
0:0 ≤epH  
0:1 >epH  
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and conclude with a 90% confidence level that decision-makers used the expected 
demand policy to determine their order quantities. 
HDB model regression analysis result in Figure 30 shows that the predictor, EOQ 
has a coefficient of 0.114 ( up̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 2.48.  Since the value of 35,05.0t = 
1.69, so we have 35,2/0 αtt > .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of the utility model 
policy hypothesis (5.2) which states 
0:0 ≤upH  
0:1 >upH  
and conclude with a 90% confidence level that decision-makers used the utility model 
policy to determine their order quantities. 
HDB model regression analysis result in Figure 30 shows that the predictor, Dt-1 
has a coefficient of 0.010 ( dp̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 0.66.  Since the value of 
35,05.0t = 1.69, so we have 35,2/0 αtt < .  Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the 
demand chasing hypothesis (5.3) which states 
0:0 ≤dpH  
0:1 >dpH  
and conclude with a 90% confidence level that decision-makers did not adjust their order 
quantities toward the previous period’s demand. 
HDB model regression analysis result in Figure 30 shows that the predictor, qt-1 
has a coefficient of 0.504 ( qp̂ >0) and a t-test statistics of 3.56.  Since the value of 
35,05.0t = 1.69, so we have 35,2/0 αtt > .  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of the 
demand chasing hypothesis (5.4) which states 
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0:0 ≤qpH  
0:1 >qpH  
and conclude with a 90% confidence level that decision-makers anchored their order 
quantity on the previous period’s order quantity. 
Table 19: Exp. I (Post Learning NV) Individual Subject HDB Fit Summary Results 
Subject pe pu pd pq Sum 
1 0.139 -0.164 -0.0917 1.13 1.0133 
2 0.943 0.0465 -0.0292 0.126 1.0863 
3 0.502 -0.0239 -0.0899 0.668 1.0562 
4 0.218 0.44 -0.009 0.357 1.006 
5 0.539 0.414 0.219 -0.253 0.919 
6 0.87 0.796 -0.277 -0.31 1.079 
7 0.986 0.274 -0.385 0.192 1.067 
8 0.663 0.133 -0.139 0.412 1.069 
9 0.746 0.413 0.126 -0.135 1.15 
10 1.12 -0.188 -0.537 0.658 1.053 
11 0.181 -0.0171 0.286 0.37 0.8199 
12 0.475 -0.117 0.253 0.402 1.013 
13 0.541 0.323 0.075 0.106 1.045 
14 0.392 0.175 0.188 0.246 1.001 
15 0.952 0.318 0.0014 -0.27 1.0014 
16 0.215 0.102 0.145 0.505 0.967 
17 0.444 0.0108 0.467 0.095 1.0168 
18 0.182 0.0413 0.132 0.692 1.0473 
19 0.448 0.101 -0.266 0.752 1.035 
20 0.08 0.0152 0.0633 0.858 1.0165 
21 0.0439 0.0142 0.00997 0.925 0.99307 
22 0 1 0 0 1 
Average 0.48545 0.186682 0.006449 0.342091 1.020671 
 
Table 19 presents the HDB parameter estimates of individual subject.  It is 
interesting that almost all the coefficients are positive, which means that the order 
quantity of individual newsvendor subject is affected in a similar manner.  For example, 
the coefficients of pu are positive for most subjects, which means most subjects increase 
their order quantities with higher profit margin. 
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The HDB model completeness hypothesis which states 
1:0 =+++ qdue ppppH  
1:1 ≠+++ qdue ppppH  
tests if the sum of the coefficients in the HDB model equals to 1, which implies 
individual newsvendor order quantity is a weighted average of four NV requisition 
policies.  A one sample t-test result (Figure 31) fails to reject the null hypothesis and we 
conclude with 95% confidence level that the sum of coefficient for the HDB model prior 
to learning NV equals to 1. 
Test of mu = 1 vs not = 1 
 
Variable   N     Mean    StDev  SE Mean        95% CI           T      P 
After NV  22  1.02067  0.06494  0.01385  (0.99188, 1.04946)  1.49  0.150 
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5.1.4 Experiment I Conclusion 
This Section highlights the results of the single NV experiments, conducted with an 
identical pool of student subjects, before and after the subjects received formal training 
on newsvendor problem.  Table 20 presents a summary of major results before and after 
NV training. 
The first significant result is that a class room training of NV problem prior to the 
NV experiment does little, if any, in improving newsvendor decision making in terms of 
reducing human decision bias and improving profits.  This ineffectiveness of classroom 
NV training in improving NV decision-making is somewhat surprising because 90% of 
the subjects have answered all theoretical NV problems correctly.  We observed under 
the high profit conditions, decision-makers seemed to order closer to the EOQ after 
learning about NV.  However, subjects’ average order quantities deviated further from 
EOQ under the low profit margin conditions.   
Second, the human decision bias (HDB) regression analysis of the empirical data 
supports the anchoring and insufficient adjustment heuristic (Schweitzer and Cachon, 
2000) as the cause of human decision bias.  The HDB model shows that the effect of the 
anchoring at the previous order quantity ordering policy is significantly larger than the 
effect of EOQ order policy before and after subjects received NV training.  As a result, 
subject’s subsequent order quantities were significantly anchored at the first order 
quantity.  Since the subject’s first order quantity was between the expected demand and 
the EOQ, with slow or insignificant adjustment towards EOQ, human decision bias 
persisted.  The question is: Why do subjects not adjust?   
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Figure 32: Probability of Loss and Profit vs.  Newsvendor Order Quantity 
Two reasons may explain the insufficient adjustment effect.  First, subjects were 
content with the profit they were making and did not find it necessary to adjust their order 
quantities.  This is most apparent in high profit margin (C-) conditions where subjects can 
easily make profit due to low probability of losses and the decreasing rate of expected 
profit increases.  Figure 32 illustrates these characteristics of NV investment in high 
profit margin item (C-): 
1. The probability of loss is relatively low between mean (150) and EOQ (225) 
which means subjects will make profit more than 80% of the time. 
2. The rate of expected profit increase is relatively flat between mean (150) and 
EOQ (225) which explains subject’s reluctance to adjust.   
Subjects seem content with the steady growth of wealth and become satisfied with the 
current order level.  They may make small changes in response to demand spikes, but 
these small adjustments to the order quantities were not significant enough to eliminate 
human decision bias.   
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The second reason for the insufficient adjustment is that subjects made wrong 
adjustments to their order quantities.  This is evident in the high wealth high cost 
(C+W+) condition where the subjects’ initial order quantities were significantly higher 
than EOQ and the subjects were losing money.  Subjects then increased their order 
quantities to make up for losses.  Unfortunately, increasing order quantities away from 
EOQ (75) resulted in greater probability of loss (Figure 32) and lower expected profit.  
This risk-seeking over loss behavior is best captured by the prediction of the Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Finally, empirical data seems to support this somewhat counterintuitive notion 
that given a similar level of wealth and NV investment option, a subject whose wealth is 
below initial wealth and a subject whose wealth is above initial wealth will invest in 
different manners.  Consider the C+W- and C+W+ subjects in our empirical studies.  The 
order quantities of C+W- subjects were steady over the span of wealth greater than wo, 
but the order quantities of C+W+ subjects were increasing over the span of wealth which 
was less than wo (i.e. increasing order quantity after loss).  If the trends in both treatment 
conditions are extrapolated by another 20-30 order periods, the low initial wealth subjects 
would have about the same amount of wealth as the high initial wealth subjects would, 
but they would order in starkly different manners.  This conjecture is consistent to the 
results of the concert ticket experiment where subjects who have lost a $20 ticket are 
more likely to go home without watching the concert than those who have lost $20 in 
cash (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). 
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Table 20: Exp. I Result Summary 
 Analysis 
Prior to 
Training Post Training Comments 







to most of the effects 





After training, subjects’ 
wealth factor is not as 
significant as before. 
Interaction of profit margin 





Wealth effect is 
significant only in the 
low profit margin. 
Average initial OQ 
< 150 for all 
conditions 
< 150 for low 
profit item,  
> 150 for high 
profit item 
Subjects showed impact 
of experience 
% of subjects with significant 
profit margin factor 83.30% 77.27% 
No significant changes 
before and after training
% of subjects with significant 
wealth factor 37.50% 45.45% 
No significant changes 
before and after training
Significant trend observed in 
OQ vs.  wealth C+W+ C+W+ 
Order quantities 
increased as wealth 
decreased in C+W+ 
condition.  Risk seeking 
over loss. 
Significant trend observed in 
OQ vs.  time C+W-, C-W- C+W+, C+W-
Slope was generally 
small 
Deviation from mean Significant Significant 
Human decision bias 
observed 
Deviation from profit 
maximizing EOQ Significant Significant 
Human decision bias is 
significant before and 
after NV training 
Average subjects' profit 
compared with EOQ policy -17% -23% 
Learning did not 
improve profit 
No of subjects achieved 
higher profit than EOQ policy 0 1 
A subject learnt the 
concept and applied it. 
Average numbers of unit 
short 39.98 32.56 
Unit shortage is greater 
before NV training 
Average numbers of unit over 35.98 51.35 
Unit overage is greater 
after NV training 
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Adjustment: No change from 
previous order quantity 45.90% 43.40% 
Consistent for before and 
after learning 
Adjustment: Change order 
quantity toward previous 
demand 36.70% 39.80% 
Consistent for before and 
after learning 
Adjustment: Change order 
quantity away from previous 
demand 17.40% 16.80% 
Consistent for before and 
after learning 
Correlation between direction 
of change in order and 
difference between previous 






Before learning: 45.8% of 
the subjects showed 
significant correlation.  
After learning: 45.5%. 
C-W+ 155.44 177.98 
Subjects consistently 
ordered too low for high 
profit item 
C+W+ 114.84 140.86 
Subjects consistently 
ordered too high for low 
profit item 
C+W- 88.73 129.92 
Subjects consistently 
ordered too high for low 
profit item 
C-W- 160.68 179.13 
Subjects consistently 
ordered too low for high 
profit item 
Standard Deviation of OQ 51.08 56.62 
Consistently below the 
standard deviation of 
random demand (75.0). 
qPRA* < qWRA*  Significant Significant 
Wealthier decision-makers 
ordered more. 
0:0 ≤epH  
0:1 >epH  0.184 0.401 
Subjects relied significantly 
more on expected demand 
after training. 
0:0 ≤upH  
0:1 >upH  0.173 0.114 
Subjects consistently 
anchored their decisions on 
utility order policy 
0:0 ≤dpH  
0:1 >dpH  0.044 0.009(n.s.) 
The magnitude of demand 
chasing heuristic is 
relatively small 
0:0 ≤qpH  
0:1 >qpH  0.558 0.504 
Subjects consistently 
anchored their decision 
mostly on previous order 
quantity 
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5.2 Experiment II: Effects of Item Profit Margin and Item Salvage Value 
This Section presents empirical results of statistical analysis of the effects of item profit 
margin and non-zero item salvage value on newsvendor decision-making.  This empirical 
study extends current empirical studies of the NV problem which have only tested the 
significance of item profit margin (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000, Bolton and Katok, 
2004).  Student subjects from the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering at 
Georgia Tech were recruited to participate in this experiment.  These students were 
enrolled in a course that would teach the concept and the formulation of the classical 
newsvendor problem.  This group of students participated in this experiment before and 
after they learned the concept and formula of the NV problem. 
5.2.1 Experiment II Design and Protocols 
This 22 factorial design experiment has 4 treatment levels (Table 21).  The item profit 




−  has 2 levels, the low profit margin (0.25) and the high profit 
margin (0.75).  The item salvage value has 2 levels, the zero salvage value and the non-
zero salvage value.   
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Each treatment level was replicated 4 times.  The experiment run order was 
randomized to eliminate any time dependency effects.  This experiment utilized the same 
procedure as the NV Experiment I discussed in previous Section.  This experiment was 
conducted before subjects received NV training in June, 2004 and after subjects received 
NV training in July 2004.  28 subjects completed this experiment before learning NV 
problem and 27 subjects completed this experiment after learning NV problem. 
5.2.2 Experiment II Results and Analysis (Before Learning NV) 
This Section compiles the statistical analyses on the data collected from this experiment 
into two major categories: 
1. Factorial design experiment analyses. 
2. Analyses of mean and variance of NV order quantity. 
5.2.2.1 Factorial design experiment analyses 
This factorial experiment analysis investigates the significance of the nonzero salvage 
value term and the item profit margin term on newsvendor order quantities before 
subjects receive formal training on NV problem.  The average order quantity of all 
subjects from each treatment level replication was compiled in such a way that each 
treatment condition has 4 data points.  Figure 33 presents the normal probability plot of 
residuals.  This plot appears satisfactory, so we have no reason to suspect problems with 
the validity of our assumptions on the underlying distribution.   
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Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals
(response is Order Qu)
 
Figure 33: Exp. II (Before Learning NV) Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals 
Average order quantity 
This factorial design experiment is set up and analyzed in the MINITAB version 
14 software.  Figure 34 displays the effect estimates, the regression coefficients, and the 
sum of squares for each main effect and interaction.  For these subjects, this statistical 
analysis indicates only the item profit margin to significantly affect newsvendor order 
quantity.  The estimated effect for the cost term is -68.25 which means decision-makers 
ordered less under higher cost conditions than under lower cost conditions.  The nonzero 
salvage value and its interaction with the item profit margin terms are not significant. 
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Estimated Effects and Coefficients for Order (coded units) 
 
Term                  Effect      Coef     SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                        159.45       3.098   51.48  0.000 
Cost                  -68.25    -34.12       3.098  -11.02  0.000 
Cost-Sal                1.34      0.67       3.098    0.22  0.832 
Cost*Cost-Sal           6.01      3.01       3.098    0.97  0.351 
 
Analysis of Variance for Order (coded units) 
 
Source                DF      Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS      F      P 
Main Effects           2     18637.0    18637.0     9318.5  60.70  0.000 
2-Way Interactions     1       144.6      144.6      144.6   0.94  0.351 
Residual Error        12      1842.2     1842.2      153.5 
  Pure Error          12      1842.2     1842.2      153.5 
Total                 15     20623.9 
Figure 34: Exp. II (Before Learning NV) Factorial Design Analysis and ANOVA Summary 
Individual order quantity 
This section investigates the percentage of NV subjects whose decision-making is 
influenced by either the item cost term or the nonzero salvage value term.  The analysis 
results (Table 22) show that 75% of the subjects were influenced by at least one of the 
main factors.  The item profit margin and the nonzero salvage value factors affected the 
decision making of 68% and 14% of the subjects respectively.   
Table 22: Exp. II (Before Learning NV) Summary of Percentage of Participants with 
Significant Factors 
Factor Significant Not Significant 
Profit Margin 68% 32% 
Cost-Salvage Values 14% 86% 
Either One 75% 25% 
 
From the factorial design analysis results, we can conclude that the introduction 
of a salvage value term in the NV problem does not significantly influence the NV 
decision-making. 
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5.2.2.2 Descriptive statistics of NV order quantity 
This Section discusses the existence of human decision bias as inferred from the subjects’ 
order quantities.  Figure 35 summarizes descriptive statistics and the confidence intervals 
of the average order quantity in various treatment conditions of this experiment.  These 
95% confidence intervals show that the average order quantities of subjects to deviate 
significantly from mean and from profit maximizing order quantities.  The standard 
deviations of average order quantities in all treatment condition are smaller than the 
standard deviation of the consumer demand (75.0).  The statistical analysis on the 
aggregate order quantity confirms human decision bias to exist in NV problem with and 
without item salvage value. 
Variable          N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
C-S-            112    195.91     47.30      4.47 
C-S+            112    191.24     66.05      6.24 
C+S-            112    121.65     47.55      4.49 
C+S+            112    129.01     61.83      5.84 
 
Variable             95.0% CI        
C-S-          (  187.05,  204.77)    
C-S+          (  178.87,  203.61)    
C+S-          (  112.75,  130.55)     
C+S+          (  117.43,  140.59)    
Figure 35: Exp. II (Before Learning NV) Descriptive Statistics and Confidence Intervals of Average Order 
Quantity 
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5.2.3 Experiment II Results and Analysis (Post Learning NV) 
This section compiles the statistical analyses on the data collected from experiment II 
subjects who have received NV training.  The classroom exercise results indicated the 
student subjects understood the methods to solve the NV problem.  We again present the 
statistical analyses of the data collected from this experiment in two major categories: 
1. Factorial design experiment analyses. 
2. Analyses of mean and variance of NV order quantity. 
5.2.3.1 Factorial design experiment analyses 
This factorial experiment analysis investigates the significance of the nonzero salvage 
value term and the item profit margin term on newsvendor order quantities after subjects 
receive formal training on NV problem.  The average order quantity of all subjects from 
each treatment level replication was compiled in such a way that each treatment condition 
has 4 data points.  Figure 36 presents the normal probability plot of residuals.  This plot 
appears satisfactory, so we have no reason to suspect problems with the validity of our 
assumptions on the underlying distribution.   
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Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals
(response is Average)
 
Figure 36: Exp. II (Post Learning NV) Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals 
Average order quantity 
This factorial design experiment is set up and analyzed in the MINITAB version 
14 software.  Figure 37 displays the effect estimates, the regression coefficients, and the 
sum of squares for each main effect and interaction.  For these subjects, this statistical 
analysis indicates only the item profit margin to significantly affect newsvendor order 
quantity.  The estimated effects for the cost term is -71.73 which means decision-makers 
ordered less under higher cost conditions than under lower cost conditions.  The nonzero 
salvage value and its interaction with the item profit margin terms are not significant. 
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Estimated Effects and Coefficients for Average (coded units) 
 
Term                  Effect      Coef     SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                        148.80       2.211   67.29  0.000 
Cost                  -71.73    -35.87       2.211  -16.22  0.000 
Cost-Sal               -3.85     -1.93       2.211   -0.87  0.401 
Cost*Cost-Sal           7.34      3.67       2.211    1.66  0.123 
 
Analysis of Variance for Average (coded units) 
 
Source                DF      Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS      F      P 
Main Effects           2     20641.0    20641.0    10320.5 131.90  0.000 
2-Way Interactions     1       215.7      215.7      215.7   2.76  0.123 
Residual Error        12       939.0      939.0       78.2 
  Pure Error          12       939.0      939.0       78.2 
Total                 15     21795.6 
Figure 37: Exp. II (Post Learning NV) Factorial Design Analysis and ANOVA Summary 
Individual order quantity 
This Section investigates the percentage of NV subjects whose decision-making is 
influenced by either the item cost term or the nonzero salvage value term.  The analysis 
results (Table 23) show that 70% of the subjects were influenced by at least one of the 
main factors.  The item profit margin and the nonzero salvage value factors affected the 
decision making of 67% and 22% of the subjects respectively.   
Table 23: Exp. II (Post Learning NV) Summary of Percentage of Participants with 
Significant Factors 
Factor Significant Not Significant 
Profit Margin 67% 33% 
Cost-Salvage Values 22% 78% 
Either One 70% 30% 
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From the factorial design analysis results, we can conclude that the introduction 
of a salvage value term in the NV problem does not significantly influence the NV 
decision-making. 
5.2.3.2 Descriptive statistics of NV order quantity 
This Section discusses the existence of human decision bias as inferred from the subjects’ 
order quantities.  Figure 38 summarizes descriptive statistics and the confidence intervals 
of the average order quantity in various treatment conditions of this experiment.  These 
95% confidence intervals show that the average order quantities of subjects to deviate 
significantly from mean and from profit maximizing order quantities.  The standard 
deviations of average order quantities in all treatment condition are smaller than the 
standard deviation of the consumer demand (75.0).  The statistical analysis on the 
aggregate order quantity confirms human decision bias to exist in NV problem with and 
without item salvage value. 
Variable          N      Mean     StDev   SE Mean 
C-S-            108    190.26     48.45      4.66 
C-S+            108    179.06     65.10      6.26 
C+S-            108    111.19     52.08      5.01 
C+S+            108    114.68     61.43      5.91 
 
Variable             95.0% CI             
C-S-          (  181.02,  199.50)  
C-S+          (  166.65,  191.48)    
C+S-          (  101.25,  121.12)   
C+S+          (  102.96,  126.39)   
 
Figure 38: Exp. II (Post Learning NV) Descriptive Statistics and Confidence Intervals of Average Order 
Quantity 
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5.2.4 Experiment II Conclusion 
This section discusses the major findings from Experiment II before and after student 
subjects receive formal training on NV problem.   
The most surprising result is that learning about the newsvendor problem a short 
time prior to the experiment did not remove the newsvendor decision bias as indicated in 
Figure 39.  A slight improvement in NV decision-making after receiving NV training is 
found under the low profit conditions (C+S+, C+S-) where the average order quantities 
are closer to the EOQ (75). 
 
Figure 39: Exp. II Average Order Quantity vs.  Run Sequence 
Table 25 presents a summary of major results of experiment II before and after 
subjects received NV training.  The newsvendor decision-makers consistently ordered too 
much under low profit margin condition and ordered too little under high profit margin 
condition.  Profit margin factor was the only main factor influencing newsvendor 
decision-makers across all treatment conditions.  Introduction of salvage value did not 
































C-S- C-S+ C+S- C+S+
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An implication to this result is that the seller has power over the retailer under the 
high profit margin condition by his ability to choose the most favorable ‘buyback’ 
contract.  Consider a NV item of profit margin, m which gives an optimal order quantity, 
q*.  Due to the inefficiency of supplier-retailer wholesale pricing contract, there is not a 
wholesale price to which the retailer, as the price-taker, will order at q*.  A “Buyback” 
contract is introduced to create a profit margin for the retailers equal to the item profit 
margin, m (Pasternack, 1985).  The cost structure in the high profit margin condition 
(p=12, c=3, s=0) has an item profit margin of 0.75 and an optimal stocking level, q* of 
225.  It is easy to see that any wholesale price between $3 and $12 will result in a 
retailer’s optimal order quantity to be less than q*.  However, the supplier can introduce 
buyback contracts as shown in Table 24 where risk neutral retailers will order at q*. 
Table 24: High Profit Margin Buyback Contracts 
Contract Wholesale Price Buyback Price Retail Price 
1 9 8 $12 
2 7.5 6 $12 
3 3 0 $12 
 
Given the situation as depicted above, it is most beneficial for the supplier to 
choose option 1 because option 1 has the highest expected profit for the supplier and the 
optimal order quantity of the retailers is always q* regardless of supplier’s contract offer.  
Figure 40 shows that under option 1, supplier has higher expected profit or share a bigger 
proportion of total supply chain profit than the retailers.  A fair contract which splits the 
total supply chain profit will be option 2.  Since the retailer may not know the actual cost 
of the item, the supplier can offer any contract to the retailer.  The supplier’s power to 
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choose any buyback price contract and the insignificant change in the retailer’s order 
quantity with respect to the item salvage value (buyback value) term, as shown by the 
empirical evidence, result in a seller dominant market under the high profit margin 
condition. 
 





















Figure 40: Profit against Demand of Various Buyback Contracts 
The empirical evidence here also disputes the theoretical inefficiency of the 
supplier-retailer wholesale contract in the low item profit margin condition.  Due to 
human decision bias, retailers’ order quantity is higher than q* for low profit margin.  
Setting a supplier-retailer wholesale contract with a wholesale price, w between c and p 
may prove to be just the remedy to decrease retailer’s order quantity to adhere closer to 
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q*.  Therefore, the decrease in the item profit margin for the retailer with HDB results in a 
reduction of the too high order quantity. 
Table 25: Exp. II Result Summary 
Analysis  Before Learning NV After Learning NV 
Number of participants 28 27 
Normality test yes yes 
Profit margin factor Significant at 95% Significant at 95% 
Salvage value factor Not significant Not significant 
Interaction between main factors Not significant Not significant 
Initial order quantity 
< 150 for low profit 
item,  
> 150 for high profit 
item 
< 150 for low profit 
item,  
> 150 for high profit 
item 
% of subjects with significant 
profit margin factor 67.86% 66.67% 
% of subjects with significant 
salvage value factor 14.29% 22.22% 
Trend of order quantity over time Not significant Not significant 
Deviation from mean Significant at 95% Significant at 95% 
Deviation from profit maximizing 
EOQ Significant at 95% Significant at 95% 
Average Order Quantity (C-S-) 195.91 190.26 
Average Order Quantity (C-S+) 191.24 179.06 
Average Order Quantity (C+S-) 121.65 111.19 
Average Order Quantity (C+S+) 129.01 114.68 
Standard Deviation of OQ 65.77 67.47 
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CHAPTER 6: MULTI-ECHELON NEWSVENDOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
EXPERIMENTS 
 
This Chapter investigates newsvendor decision-making in a multi-echelon supply chain 
(SC) system.  The effects of NV initial wealth and item profit margin on the order 
quantity of NV subjects under tight and loose supplier-retailer relationship are studied in 
a NV supply chain game.  Empirical evidence will show (1) information sharing between 
supplier and retailer improves NV decision-making for the suppliers but not for the 
retailers, (2) the human decision bias exists in this multi-echelon NV supply chain and 
accounts for more than 25% of loss of total supply chain profit, (3) a reversed “Bullwhip 
Effect” exists in NV supply chain, and (4) the suppliers rely on different procurement 
policies of the HDB model under different relationships with the retailers. 
6.1 Empirical Studies of Supply Chain: A Literature Review 
This section reviews related empirical research in supply chain systems.  A key tradeoff 
in supply chain systems is keeping inventory costs low and customer service levels high.  
The upstream amplification of inventory variability in the supply chain, known as the 
bullwhip effect, is a major area of opportunity to reduce supply chain inventory costs, 
which account for about 20-40% of the cost of the product.  It is not surprising that a 
significant amount of research, both theoretical and empirical, in supply chain inventory 
management investigates sources of the bullwhip effects and ways to reduce it (Disney 
and Towill, 2003). 
Empirical methodologies on supply chain systems can be divided into two major 
categories.  The first utilizes computer simulation of SC systems such as a bullwhip 
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effect simulator system developed to study how information sharing can improve supply 
chain performance (Gangopadhyay and Huang, 2002).  The second methodology 
involves human subjects playing different roles in a SC system.  The “Beer Distribution 
Game” is the most commonly used role-playing simulation of a supply chain system in 
many management courses as well as industry settings.  Participants in this game play an 
assortment of inventory managerial roles in the SC with the objective of optimizing the 
tradeoff between holding cost and backlog cost.  Sterman (1989) was first to use this role 
playing simulation of SC system to analyze the “bullwhip effect” and found the human 
behavioral cause of this upstream oscillation and amplification of customer demand in the 
SC system.  The investigator concludes that subjects are biased towards incoming 
demand and often fail to account for pipeline inventory.  Croson and Donohue (2002), 
and Banerji et al. (2004) extend Sterman’s result to investigate effects of different 
parameters in the beer games such as lead time, number of echelons, different demand 
characteristics, and information sharing on SC performance. 
We developed and ran a newsvendor supply chain game which differed from the 
“Beer Distribution Game” in two ways.  First, while the “Beer Distribution Game” allows 
participant to hold inventory from one period to another for a certain holding cost, the 
newsvendor SC game does not have a holding cost.  Perishable items such as fresh 
produce, newspapers, or fashion goods are salvaged in the end of the selling period.  
Second, the objective of the newsvendor supply chain game is different from the 
objective of the “Beer Distribution Game”.  The newsvendor SC game maximizes total 
profit while the non perishable SC game minimizes total cost.   
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This newsvendor SC game is set up to study the effects of item profit margin, NV 
initial wealth, and the relationship between supplier and retailer on the performance of 
the supply chain system.  The item profit margin and the NV initial wealth are proven 
both analytically and empirically to affect the order quantity in the single newsvendor 
setting.  The newsvendor SC game extends the empirical studies of NV problem to a 
multi-echelon newsvendors setting.   
Information sharing and cooperation between different players in the SC systems 
are some ways of improving the performance of the SC.  The cooperation between 
multiple retailers of newsvendor type products with transshipments will theoretically 
increase the expected profit for the retailers in the cooperation pool (Fransoo et al., 2005).  
The investigators, like many others, rely on the assumption that the newsvendor will 
order the optimal order quantity of the classic NV problem. 
6.2 Two-Echelon Newsvendor Supply Chain Game  
This Section discusses the impact of human decision bias on a 2-echelon NV supply 
chain game.  For brevity, we omit the literature review of game theory in supply chain 
management which is found in (Cachon and Netessine). 
We model a 2-echelon NV supply chain game as a Stackelberg (1934) game 
which is played by 2 players, a leader who initiates the game and a follower who 
responses.  This 2-echelon NV game defines the NV supplier as the leader and the NV 
retailer as the follower.  The leader in this game does not know the consumer demand 
completely (he may know the demand is uniformly distributed between 0 and a fixed 
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maximum number) and has to wait for signals from the follower for the missing 
information.   
The standard notation of game theory adapted from (Cachon and Netessine) 
consists of (i) players indexed by i=1,..,n, (ii) strategies denoted by xi, i=1,..,n available 
to all players and (iii) payoff πi, i=1,..,n received by each player.   
Definition 1: The best response function of player i given the strategies of other player, 
*
ix−  is defined as the strategy 
*
ix  that maximizes player i's payoff ),( iii xx −π : 
),(maxarg)(* iiixii xxxx i −−
= π . 
Definition 2: An outcome ( **2
*
1 ,,, nxxx K ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game if 
*
ix  is the 
best response to *ix−  for all i=1,..,n. 
We will conduct this game for 2 periods with a supplier as the player 1 (P1) and a 
retailer as the player 2 (P2). 
Period 1: 
 P1 sets retail price, p and wholesale price, c and reserves capacity x1. 
Period 2: 
 P2 responses with an order quantity, x2 according to his preferences. 
 
Case 1: P1 and P2 are risk-neutral 
 We follow a game-theoretical approach and solve the problem with backward 
induction.  We begin by first solving for the response function of the follower (retailer), 
P2, given that he has observed the leader, P1’s decision.  Then, we solve the response of 
the supplier given that he knows how the retailer will react to his decision. 
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Retailer’s response function 
Let cqDqpDq −= ),min(),(2π  be the payoff function for the retailer, P2.  The expected 
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Supplier’s response function 
Let DR be the demand from the retailer with g(x) and G(x) as its p.d.f.  and c.d.f., 
respectively.  Let cs be the unit production cost and qcDqcDq sRR −= ),min(),(1π  be the 
payoff function for P1.  The expected payoff function for P1 is given by: 
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Since the probability function of the DR is such that P(DR=x2) = 1 and P(DR ≠ x2) = 0, so it 








cpFq 1* . 
The outcome of this game is a Nash equilibrium because no player can benefit from 
deviation of their respective strategies. 
 
Case 2: P1 is risk-neutral and P2 has HDB 
 We again follow the game-theoretical approach to solve this problem with 
backward induction.  We begin by first solving for the response function of P2, given that 
he has observed P1’s decision.  Then, we solve the response of the P1 given that he knows 
how the retailer will react to his decision. 
 
Retailer’s response function 
 Suppose retailer exhibits human decision bias by being risk-seeking when item 
profit margin is low and being risk-averse when item profit margin is high.  Let 
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where D  is the expected demand. 
The payoff function for retailer is 2222 ),min(),( cxDxpDx −=π  and the expected payoff 
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Supplier’s response function 
Let DR be the demand from the retailer with g(x) and G(x) as its p.d.f.  and c.d.f., 
respectively.  Let cs be the unit production cost and qcDqcDq sRR −= ),min(),(1π  be the 
payoff function for P1.  The expected payoff function for P1 is given by (2): 
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Since the probability function of the DR is such that P(DR=x2) = 1 and P(DR ≠ x2) = 0, so it 
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The outcome of this game is also a Nash equilibrium because no player can benefit from 
deviation of their respective strategies.  However, the total channel payoff in this case is 
less than the risk-neutral case. 


































The null Hypothesis 6.1 states that the total payoff of all agents in a NV game of 
HDB subjects is greater or equal to the NV game of subjects following EOQ policy.  The 
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alternative hypothesis states that the total payoff of all agents in a NV game of HDB 
subjects is less than the NV game of subjects following EOQ policy.  This hypothesis 
will be tested in the NV supply chain experiment in Section 6.5.2.   
6.3 Multi-Echelon Newsvendor HDB Model 
This Section presents a natural extension of the HDB model in the single NV setting to a 
multi-echelon NV setting.  Hypotheses of this MEHDB will be constructed and tested in 
the multi-echelon NV experiment in Section 6.5.4. 
 Consider a 2-echelon NV supply chain of n suppliers and n retailers.  Suppliers 
agree on a fixed wholesale price, cr for the retailers, and receives an order quantity from 
retailer i, qi.  Retailers set a fixed retail price, p which generates a consumer demand 









cpFq r1* .  The supplier’s optimal order quantity will also be q*.  Indeed, the 
total supply chain profit is maximized by these decisions.   
Let us assume that the retailers have different human decision biases and their 
order quantities, qRi has mean, mi and variance, vi.  For simplicity, let us rank retailers in 
an increasing manner such that mi > mj for i>j.  Two conditions of the supplier and 
retailer relationship are illustrated in Figure 41.  The first condition is a tight relationship 
(R+) which is defined as a relationship of frequent contact and information exchange 
between the retailer and supplier.  Under R+, each supplier receives order from the same 
retailer in each ordering period.  The second condition is a loose relationship (R-) which 
is defined as a relationship of infrequent contact and limited information exchange 
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between the retailer and supplier.  Under R-, each supplier will receive orders from a 
random retailer in each ordering period. 
 
Figure 41: Exp. III Relationship between Suppliers and Retailers 
 
Under different relationship conditions and human decision bias, we propose the 
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qtS : The supplier’s order quantity at time t 
peS : Weight of supplier’s reliance on expected demand policy 
puS : Weight of supplier’s reliance on EOQ 
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pqS : Weight of supplier’s reliance on qt-1  
qtRi : Retailer i’s order quantity at time t  
peRi : Weight of retailer i’s reliance on expected demand policy 
puRi : Weight of retailer i’s reliance on EOQ 
pdRi : Weight of retailer i’s reliance on chasing consumer’s demand policy 
pqRi : Weight of retailer i’s reliance on qt-1  
D : Expected value of consumer demand 










cpFq 1*  
Dt : Realization of consumer demand at time t. 
 Notice that the MEHDB model for the retailer is the HDB model proposed in 
Chapter 4 because the supply chain game condition for the retailers is set up the same 
way as the single NV setting.  The MEHDB model for the NV supplier includes the 
factors affecting downstream retailer’s decision as described in (2).  Obviously, this 
model can extend to a more general multi-echelon NV decision bias model, where the 
upstream agent’s decision is affected by all downstream agents’ decisions.  For example, 
in this 2-echelon case, the supplier’s order quantity is affected by the consumer’s demand 
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 The demand distribution faced by the suppliers varies under different relationship 
conditions due to human decision bias.  In the tight relationship (R+) case, where a 
supplier S is paired with a retailer throughout the SC game, the index i for the retailers in 
Equation (3) is a constant because supplier S only deals with one retailer.  Therefore, the 
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(R+) supplier faces the demand distribution (mi, vi) with probability 1 throughout the 
game.  In the loose relationship (R-) case, where different retailers order from a supplier, 
the supplier S faces different demand distributions (mi, vi) with probability bi, which is the 
probability that retailer i is selected to order from supplier S. 






















Hypothesis 6.2 states that the R+ supplier will rely more on the retailer’s order quantity 
than R- supplier.  This hypothesis will be tested in the NV supply chain experiment in 
Section 6.5.5.  The motivation to develop this hypothesis lies in the fact that supplier is 
more likely to face less demand variation in the R+ case than in the R- case.  To illustrate 
this hypothesis analytically, we define: 
Pt+1(α)  : Probability of qtRi - α < qt+1Ri < qtRi + α 
α   : The absolute deviation from previous order quantity 
Assume vi is constant and retailer’s order quantity is normally distributed, then 
Pt+1(α) is constant for the R+ supplier.  For the R- supplier there is 1/n chance that 
Pt+1(α) remain constant, and (n-1)/n chance that it will change.  Figure 42 illustrates a 
case of 2 retailers in the NV supply chain.  Supplier faces demand from retailer 1, qR1 in 
tight relationship condition.  Supplier faces demand from retailer 1 or 2 with equal 
probability under loose relationship condition.  The shaded area in (a) shows the Pt+1(α) 
for R+ supplier and the shaded area in (b) shows the Pt+1(α) for R- supplier.   
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Figure 42: Comparison of Probability of Retailer’s Demand under Various Relationship Conditions 
 
Proposition 6.1: Pt+1(α) for R- < Pt+1(α) for R+.   
Proof: Let m1 = m2 – k, where k > 0 is the difference between the average order quantities 
of retailer 1 and retailer 2.  Let iv=σ  be the standard deviation of retailer’s order 
quantity. 
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= Pt+1(α) for R- (shaded region in Figure 42b)   
 
This result implies that R+ suppliers will rely on chasing retailer demand heuristic more 
than the R- suppliers will.   
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6.4 Experiment III Design and Protocols 
This Section presents the design and the protocols of this multi-echelon newsvendor 
experiment.  The response variable is newsvendor’s order quantity.  The independent 
variables are (C) item profit margin, (W) NV initial wealth, and (R) relationship between 
supplier and retailer.  This 23 factorial design experiment has 8 treatment conditions as 
shown in Table 26. 
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The treatment conditions for the item profit margin and NV initial wealth are 
similar to the single NV experiment I in Chapter 5.2.  There are 2 treatment conditions 
for the relationship term, the loose relationship (R-) and the tight relationship (R+) as 
illustrated in Figure 41.  This experiment assumes that when a retailer orders more than 
what the supplier has in stock, the retailer will be able to get the unfilled order at cost 
from the supplier who will not make any profit.  This assumption will limit the 
introduction of a shortage effect to the experiment and will allow us to better condition 
the effect of relationship term on NV decision-making. 
Student subjects from the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering were 
recruited to participate in this experiment.  This group of students participated in this 
experiment after they learned the concept and formula of the NV problem.  Each 
treatment level was replicated 10 times.  The subjects were told to order in such a way 
that would maximize their final wealth.  The subjects were not informed the length of the 
experiment and were told that the experiments might end at any time.  The actual demand 
was randomly generated during the experiment with the same random number generators 
previously used to provide past demand data for the subjects.  Each subject was randomly 
selected to role play as either a supplier or a retailer.  The suppliers and the retailers were 
separated into 2 rooms.  Subjects either began with (R+C-W+) treatment condition or 
with (R-C-W+) treatment conditions. 
 
Detailed procedure: 
1. Each subject is provided with the consent form to participate in the experiment 
voluntarily and is informed that the subject can stop anytime during the experiment 
without penalty. 
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2. Upon receipt of the consent form, the principal investigator (PI) will provide each 
subject with past demand data. 
3. The subject is then told about subject’s current wealth level and the current cost 
structure of the item. 
4. The PI informs the supplier subjects to place an order within a range. 
5. The individual suppliers place order quantities. 
6. The PI inform the retailer subjects to place orders within a range 
7. The individual retailers place order quantities. 
8. Retailers’ order are conveyed to the suppliers by 
a. Mixing all orders together and randomly assigning one to each supplier for 
loose relationship conditions. 
b. Assigning the same retailer’s order to the same supplier for tight relationship 
conditions. 
9. The supplier is given time to review the demand data and current wealth. 
10. The retailer is informed of the actual demand for that period and the resulting profit 
or loss. 
11. The retailer is given time to review the demand data and current wealth. 
12. Repeat step 3 until all subjects have completed the preset number of order periods. 
A total of 35 subjects participated in the experiment as retailers, but only 23 of 
these retailer subjects completed the experiments.  A total of 43 subjects participated in 
the experiment as suppliers, but only 25 of these supplier subjects completed the 
experiments.  As a result, we report results from 23 retailer subjects and 25 supplier 
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subjects.  The experiment had been previously certified by the Institute Review Board 
(IRB) and was conducted at Georgia Institute of Technology in November, 2004. 
6.5 Experiment III Results and Analyses 
This Section presents the statistical analyses of the data collected from this multi-echelon 
NV supply chain experiment in five major categories: 
1. Factorial design experiment analyses. 
2. Analyses of NV supply chain performance. 
3. Analyses of the “Bullwhip Effect” in NV supply chain. 
4. MEHDB model fits. 
5. Trends in NV’s preferences of various procurement policies. 
Empirical evidence will show (1) information sharing between supplier and 
retailer improves NV decision-making for the suppliers but not for the retailers, (2) the 
human decision bias exists in this multi-echelon NV supply chain and accounts for more 
than 25% of loss of total supply chain profit, (3) a reversed “Bullwhip Effect” exists in 
NV supply chain, and (4) the suppliers rely on different NV requisition policies of the 
MEHDB model under different relationship with the retailers. 
6.5.1 Factorial Design Experiment Analyses 
This section presents a 23 factorial experiment analysis to investigate the significance of 
the NV’s initial wealth term, the item profit margin term, and the relationship between 
supplier and retailer term on newsvendor’s decision-making.  The response variables are 
supplier’s average order quantity, the absolute deviation of supplier’s order quantity from 
retailer’s demand and retailer’s average order quantity. 
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6.5.1.1 Supplier’s average order quantity 
The average order quantity of all supplier subjects from each treatment level replication 
was compiled in such a way that each of 8 treatment conditions has 10 data points.  























Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals
(response is Supplier Order Quantity)
 
Figure 43: Exp. III Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals 
Figure 44 displays the effect estimate, the regression coefficient, and the sum of 
squares for each main effect and interaction.  For these subjects, this statistical analysis 
indicates all three main effects and the interaction between these factors to significantly 
affect newsvendor order quantity.  The estimated effects for the aggregate data set shows 
the initial wealth term had positive effect of 18.3 which means higher order quantity is 
achieved at the high initial wealth level.  The estimated effects for the profit margin term 
is 28.55 which means decision-makers ordered more under higher profit margin 
conditions than under lower profit margin conditions.  The estimated effects for the 
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relationship term is -19.83 which means decision-makers ordered more under loose 
relationship than under tight relationship conditions.   
Estimated Effects and Coefficients for Supplier Order Quantity (coded units) 
 
Term                                Effect     Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant                                    132.708    1.199  110.67  0.000 
Profit Margin                       28.554   14.277    1.199   11.91  0.000 
Wealth                              18.304    9.152    1.199    7.63  0.000 
Relationship                       -19.838   -9.919    1.199   -8.27  0.000 
Profit Margin*Wealth                -4.786   -2.393    1.199   -2.00  0.050 
Profit Margin*Relationship         -10.376   -5.188    1.199   -4.33  0.000 
Wealth*Relationship                 -4.302   -2.151    1.199   -1.79  0.077 
Profit Margin*Wealth*Relationship    6.164    3.082    1.199    2.57  0.012 
 
 
S = 10.7251   R-Sq = 80.70%   R-Sq(adj) = 78.82% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for Supplier Order Quantity (coded units) 
 
Source              DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS      F      P 
Main Effects         3  30878.3  30878.3  10292.8  89.48  0.000 
2-Way Interactions   3   2981.5   2981.5    993.8   8.64  0.000 
3-Way Interactions   1    759.9    759.9    759.9   6.61  0.012 
Residual Error      72   8282.0   8282.0    115.0 
  Pure Error        72   8282.0   8282.0    115.0 
Total               79  42901.6 
 
Figure 44: Exp. III Factorial Design Analysis and ANOVA Summary 
For these subjects, the interaction plot (Figure 45) shows that the two way 
interactions between these factors are generally mild except for interaction between the 
profit margin term and the relationship term.  The interaction plot in the lower left corner 
of Figure 45 shows that the effect of relationship term is small when the profit margin is 
low and large when the profit margin is high.  Therefore, we can conclude that initial 
wealth effect affects newsvendor decision-making most when item cost is high and that 
the item profit margin effect affects newsvendor decision-making regardless of the levels 
of newsvendor’s initial wealth. 


























Interaction Plot (data means) for Supplier Order Quantity
 
Figure 45: Exp. III Interaction Plots of Supplier’s Order Quantity 
The cube plot (Figure 46) is used to investigate any three-way interaction between 
these factors.  The effect of the item profit margin term is consistent over any 
combination of relationship term and wealth term.  The effect of the initial wealth term is 
significant over any combinations of the relationship and the item profit margin term.  
However, the effect of relationship term is very small in the low initial wealth low profit 
margin treatment combination and is very large in the low initial wealth high profit 
margin treatment combination.  The average order quantities under the low initial wealth 
and the low profit margin are lowest among all treatment conditions and may have 
contributed to the relationship between retailer and supplier to be insignificant.  This 
result suggests that the relationship between supplier and retailers term does not 
significantly affect newsvendor decision-making when the NV’s initial wealth is low and 
the item profit margin is low. 















Cube Plot (data means) for Supplier Order Quantity
 
Figure 46: Exp. III Cube Plot for Supplier Order Quantity 
6.5.1.2 Absolute deviation between the supplier’s order quantity and demand 
The following Section discusses the effect of the relationship term on the absolute 
deviation between supplier’s order quantity and the demand from retailers in this multi-
echelon NV experiment.  The absolute deviation between the supplier’s order quantity 
and the demand from the retailers is a better measure of supplier’s decision-making 
because it accounts for the demand generated by the retailers.  This analysis will reveal 
that a tighter relationship between supplier and retailer reduces the absolute deviation 
between the supplier’s order quantity and the demand from retailers. 
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Table 27: Exp. III Estimated Effects and Coefficients for Absolute Deviation 
Term                                Effect    Coef  SE Coef      T      P 
Constant                                    42.625   0.9302  45.82  0.000 
Profit Margin                       -3.980  -1.990   0.9302  -2.14  0.036 
Wealth                               4.968   2.484   0.9302   2.67  0.009 
Relationship                       -11.188  -5.594   0.9302  -6.01  0.000 
Profit Margin*Wealth                 6.906   3.453   0.9302   3.71  0.000 
Profit Margin*Relationship           8.606   4.303   0.9302   4.63  0.000 
Wealth*Relationship                  5.646   2.823   0.9302   3.03  0.003 
Profit Margin*Wealth*Relationship   -0.720  -0.360   0.9302  -0.39  0.700 
Table 27 displays the effect estimate and the regression coefficient for each main 
effect and interaction term.  This statistical analysis indicates all three main effects and 
the interaction between these factors to significantly affect the response variable.  The 
estimated effects for the relationship term is -11.19, the largest among all effects, and that 
means the quality of supplier’s order is better under tight relationship than loose 


























Interaction Plot (data means) for Absolute Deviation
 
Figure 47: Exp. III Interaction Plots of Supplier’s Order Quantity 
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The interaction plots (Figure 47) show many significant two-way interactions 
between these factors.  The top row of interaction plots show that the effect of the profit 
margin term is large when the initial wealth term is low and the relationship term is loose.  
The second row of interaction plots show that the effect of the initial wealth term is large 
when the item profit margin term is high and the relationship term is tight.  The last row 
of interaction plots show that the effect of the relationship term is large when the initial 
wealth term is low and the item profit margin is low.  The interaction plots on the 
rightmost column indicate that the tight relationship condition consistently results in 















Cube Plot (data means) for Absolute Deviation
 
Figure 48: Exp. III Cube Plot for Absolute Deviation of Supplier OQ from Demand 
Figure 48 shows the cube plot of the average absolute deviation of supplier’s 
order quantity from retailer’s demand under all treatment combinations.  The effect of the 
relationship term is significant under all treatment combinations of NV’s initial wealth 
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term and the item profit margin term except when the NV’s initial wealth is high and item 
profit margin is high.  The suppliers benefit from a tight relationship with the retailers, as 
indicated by the lower deviation number when the relationship with retailer is tight.  The 
high initial wealth high profit margin condition has the highest average order quantity 
among all treatment conditions.  This result seems to suggest that higher demand from 
retailers is more unpredictable for the suppliers.  This analysis confirms the tighter 
relationship between supplier and retailer improves supplier’s decision-making. 
Table 28: Absolute Deviation from Demand across Different Relationship Factors 
 R+ R- 
Retailers 83.2 89.0 
Suppliers 37.8 48.2 
 
Table 28 compares the magnitude of the absolute deviation from demand for the 
suppliers and for the retailers.  For these subjects, a t-test analysis on the absolute 
deviation of retailer’s order quantity from demand under different relationship treatment 
levels was not significantly different (p-value = 0.371).  It is not surprising that this result 
should purport that the relationship term does not affect the quality of retailer’s decision 
making in terms of the absolute deviation from demand because the retailers are 
conditioned in the same way in both relationship treatment conditions.  The absolute 
deviation of R+ suppliers’ order quantity from demand was significantly lower than the 
absolute deviation of R- suppliers’ order quantity from demand (p-value < 0.01).  This 
result reveals the demand information in the tight relationship is more valuable to the 
suppliers than the demand information in the loose relationship.   
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Supplier R+ Retailer R+
Supplier R- Retailer R-  
Figure 49: Absolute Deviation from Demand Run Chart 
Figure 49 plots the average of the absolute deviation of the supplier and retailer’s 
order quantities from demand over time under different relationship terms.  Each data 
point represents the aggregate value over the initial wealth and the item profit margin 
terms.  The absolute deviation between the retailer’s order quantity and demand 
fluctuates over time with high oscillation under both relationship terms.  The absolute 
deviation of the supplier’s order quantity from demand under a loose relationship (R-) is 
unaffected by more experience of dealing with random retailers.  However, the suppliers 
under tight relationship with the retailers (R+) have lower absolute deviation from the 
retailers’ demand. 
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Table 29 compares the absolute deviation of supplier’s order quantity from 
demand under the same relationship treatment levels across different run orders.  The 
deviation of tight relationship treatment (R+) the supplier’s order quantity from demand 
was not statistically different across different run orders.  On the other hand, under loose 
relationship treatment, the deviation of the order quantities of the suppliers who had 
previously faced tight relationship treatment from demand was significantly less than the 
deviation of the order quantities of the suppliers who had not previously faced a tight 
relationship treatment (p-value < 0.001).  The supplier subjects who began the game 
under loose relationship had the largest deviation from demand (p-value < 0.001).  This 
result suggests the significance of run order and the benefit of experience for the 
suppliers in going through tight relationship first for these subjects.   
Table 29: Absolute Deviation of Supplier’s OQ from Demand across Different 
Relationship Factors and Run Orders 
 Loose First Tight First 
Supplier (R-) 59.8 40.5 
Supplier (R+) 37.1 37.0 
 
6.5.1.3 Retailer’s average order quantity 
This section investigates the effects of item profit margin and NV initial wealth on the 
retailer’s order quantity under different relationship treatments.  Table 30 summarizes the 
significance of item profit margin and NV’s initial wealth terms on newsvendor order 
quantity.  This 22 factorial design analysis shows a rather counterintuitive result in that 
the NV’s initial wealth term and the item profit margin term do not affect retailer’s order 
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quantities under tight relationship with supplier (R+).  This is interesting because these 
factors are significant in all other treatment conditions, both in the single NV setting and 
in the multi-echelon NV setting.  Two explanations to this finding are proposed. 
Table 30: Exp. III Effect of Item Profit Margin and Initial Wealth Terms 
 Tight Relationship Loose Relationship 
 Wealth Profit Margin Wealth Profit Margin 
Supplier p<0.01 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Retailer n.s n.s p<0.001 p<0.001 
 
First, the retailers purposely use an unpredictable ordering policy to sabotage the 
supplier’s profit.  The supporting evidence for this conjecture is that the retailer’s 
behavior results in a 14.4% loss of the supplier’s profit.  The opposing evidence to this 
conjecture is that the retailers themselves suffer an even greater loss of 25.6% in their 
profit.  Further analysis reveals an insignificant difference in the variation of individual 
retailer’s order quantities between these two relationship conditions which suggests no 
evidence of an erratic retailer’s order policy under a tight relationship.   
Second, a substantial number of retailers exhibit the risk-seeking behavior after 
loss, previously found in the low profit margin high initial wealth condition (C+W+) in 
the single NV setting (Experiment I), and these significantly higher than EOQ order 
quantities blur the characteristics of the overall order quantities.  The risk-seeking after 
loss behavior is most apparent in the low profit margin low initial wealth condition as 
indicated in Figure 50.  This figure shows that the order quantity of the subjects with 
wealth < 0 is increasing with more losses.  The first period consumer demand for this 
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treatment was very low and that was the cause for bankrupting 35% of retailer subjects.  
What happened next to these bankrupt retailers? 25% of them ordered about 118 units on 
average and managed to end up in the positive.  The remaining 75% suffered even more 
losses as they continued to be risk-seekers with an average order quantity of more than 
165 units.  By comparison, subjects who escaped the initial demand shock had an average 
order quantity of 97.8 units.  This unusually high order quantity and high number of 
subjects with risk-seeking after loss behavior blurred the significance of the main effects.  
This result indicates that demand shock compounded by bankruptcy-aversion 
significantly impacts the retailer’s decision-making. 
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6.5.2 Analysis of NV Supply Chain Performance 
This Section discusses the impact of the human decision bias and the relationship 
between supplier and retailer on NV supply chain performance.  This research measures 
the performance of this NV supply chain by its profit and by its opportunity cost.   
6.5.2.1 NV supply chain profit 
This Section compares the average profit of the NV retailers and the average profit of the 
NV suppliers.  These agents face similar NV investment opportunities under different 
relationship treatment levels.  This research will compare the gap between their average 
profits and the rationing of the total SC profit between these NV agents.  Table 31 
indicates that the average profit gap between supplier and retailer in this multi-echelon 
NV supply chain, defined as 
profit sRetailer'
profit sRetailer' -profit  sSupplier' , is 16.5% (p-value <0.01).  
Suppliers under a tight relationship treatment conditions had an average profit of 25.7% 
more than the retailers (p-value < 0.05).  Suppliers under a loose relationship treatment 
conditions had an average profit of 9.6% more than the retailers (p-value = n.s.).  This 
result implies that supplier’s decision-making is assisted by a tighter relationship with the 
retailers. 
Table 31: Profit Gap across Different Relationship Factors 




(1 significant at 95%) 
 133  
Finally, the average profit for suppliers under tight relationship is significantly 
lower than the average profit for suppliers under loose relationship (p-value < 0.05), 
because the average demand of (R+) retailers is lower than the average demand of (R-) 
retailers.  The difference in the retailers order quantity under different relationship 
conditions is caused the difference in the computer generated consumer demand.  The 
average consumer demand in R+ of 166.9 was higher than the average consumer demand 
in R- of 147.1 (p-value < 0.05).  Due to demand chasing heuristics, R- retailers ordered 
more than R+ retailers.  However, the comparison of supplier’s overall profit and the 
theoretical EOQ profit shows that the suppliers under R+ are achieving better 
performance because their profit is closer to the theoretical optimal profit.   
6.5.2.2 Opportunity cost in NV supply chain 
This Section measures the opportunity cost due to the human decision bias in this NV 
supply chain experiment.   
A one-sample t-test shows that the total supply chain profit with theoretical EOQ 
procurement policy is 63.4% greater than the total supply chain profit in this NV game 


































We conclude with 95% that the total profit of supply chain with human decision bias is 
less than the theoretical profit using EOQ policy. 
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Further, if retailers retain their decision bias but share their procurement policies 
with the suppliers, then the total supply chain profit would have increased by 22.3%.  
Therefore, if the uncooperative supply chain cost is excluded, the loss in profit due to the 
human decision bias in newsvendor supply chain system is about 25.6%.  Current 
research in the area of improving the cooperation and the information sharing of SC 
players is certainly justified by this empirical result.  In the same way, we argue that 
human decision bias also deserves more research attention. 
 This empirical result suggests that a tight relationship between suppliers and 
retailers in a NV supply chain improves the profitability for the suppliers in terms of the 
share of supply chain profit.  Profit analysis further reveals that the total NV supply chain 
profit hinges firmly on the retailer’s procurement policy.  Furthermore, the performance 
of a NV supply chain can be improved by the reduction of the human decision bias in the 
single newsvendor setting. 
6.5.3 Bullwhip Effect in NV Supply Chain 
This Section compares the variability of order quantities of suppliers, of retailers, and of 
the consumer in 2-echelon newsvendor supply chain under different relationship levels.   
Table 32: Exp. III Standard Deviation of Order Quantity 
Treatment Conditions Supplier Retailer Consumer1 
R+ 46.61 49.03 86.39 
R- 47.91 52.49 93.49 
ALL 48.29 51.07 90.48 
(1 Consumer demand is a randomly generated number) 
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Table 32 presents the summary of standard deviation of the order quantities of different 
players in the supply chains.  A two-sample F test result indicates the following condition 
(p-value < 0.025): 
Var(Supplier (ALL))<Var(Retailer(ALL))<Var(Consumer(ALL)) 
The two-sample F tests for different relationship treatments indicate: 
• Var(Supplier (R+))<Var(Retailer (R+)) (p-value < 0.125)  
• Var(Retailer (R+))<Var(Consumer (R+)) (p-value < 0.001) 
• Var(Supplier (R-))<Var(Retailer (R-)) (p-value < 0.01) 
• Var(Retailer (R-))<Var(Consumer (R-)) (p-value < 0.001) 
Empirical evidence indicates that the “Bullwhip Effect”, empirically found in the 
supply chain of non-perishable products, does not exist in this multi-echelon newsvendor 
supply chain.  On the contrary, the variation seems to be decreasing upstream in the NV 
supply chain.   
This phenomenon can be attributed to the reduction of behavioral causes of the 
“Bullwhip Effect”.  A behavioral cause of the “Bullwhip Effect” is the misjudgment of 
the pipeline inventory by the downstream agents (Sterman, 1989).  Our experiment is set 
up in with the assumption of no lead time and no carrying of inventory, and therefore this 
behavioral cause of the “Bullwhip Effect” is eliminated in this NV supply chain. 
While early empirical data from this experiment does not deny the existence of a 
reversed “Bullwhip Effect” in NV supply chain, more can be learned about this effect in a 
“Newspaper Distribution Game”.  This novel experiment will be different from the “Beer 
Distribution Game”.  First, the NV products can not be carried over from one period to 
another.  Second, independent variables commonplace in the classic “Beer Distribution 
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Game” such as lead time, consumer demand distribution, and information sharing can be 
added to the list of factors such as item profit margin, supplier-retailer relationship, and 
NV’s initial wealth considered in this research.  Finally, contract negotiation between 
suppliers and retailers can be established by the subjects in this NV game to reflect reality 
of NV supply chain.   
6.5.4 MEHDB Model Fits 
Standard tests of multivariable linear regression model, similar to ones used in the single 
NV setting in Chapter 5.2, validate the goodness of the MEHDB models under both 
relationship conditions.  Table 33 presents a summary of significant coefficients in the 
MEHDB model under different relationship treatment conditions.   
Table 33: Supplier’s MEHDB Regression Model Fits under Various Relationship Factors 
MEHDB 
Parameter R+ R- 
peS 0.055* 0.100* 
puS 0.050 0.046* 
pdS 0.455* 0.151* 
pqS 0.420* 0.706* 
(* Significant at 90%) 
Regression analysis results are as follows: 
1. The effect of anchoring at the previous order quantities remains strong under both 
relationship conditions.  This is consistent to the previous analysis in the single 
NV setting.  This result suggests that the previous order quantity remains a strong 
predictor of NV subject’s next order quantity. 
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2. The EOQ procurement policy is not as dominant for the suppliers in this multi-
echelon setting as in the single NV setting.  Suppliers under R+ do not even rely 
on the EOQ procurement policy.  This result indicates the NV suppliers have 
higher human decision bias than the single NV because the deviation from the 
classical optimal solutions is greater here. 
3. The effect of chasing retailer’s demand heuristics is significant in the multi-
echelon NV supply chain.  Suppliers under R+ actually prefer demand chasing 
heuristics more than any other procurement policy.  Previous single NV result 
indicates insignificant demand chasing heuristics.  Hence, subjects seem more 
confident in adjustment towards the human generated demand (from retailers) 
than towards the more random computer generated demand (from consumers). 
6.5.5 Trends in Supplier’s Preferences on Various NV Requisition Policies  
This Section presents the trends of supplier’s preference on different procurement 
policies in the MEHDB model over time.  The MEHDB model can be applied to check if 
subjects exhibited trend in terms of their reliance on different variables in the model.  The 
MEHDB regression model fit the supplier’s order quantities up to period t for all t 
between 3 and 9.   
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Figure 51: Supplier’s MEHDB Effect Run Charts 
Figure 51 presents the effect run charts for suppliers under different relationship 
treatment conditions and no significant trends in subject’s reliance on EOQ or average 
demand procurement policies. 




















Figure 52: Comparison of Trends in Supplier’s MEHDB Effects 
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Significant trends exist in a supplier’s preference to previous order quantity and 
demand chasing heuristics.  Figure 52 plots the effect coefficient of supplier’s reliance on 
previous order quantity and chasing retailer’s demand under various relationship 
conditions.  This figure shows an increasing trend in d (R+) over time.  This trend means 
that the suppliers under a tight relationship (R+) are relying more on the demand chasing 
heuristics and are ordering progressively closer to the retailers’ demand from previous 
periods.  These suppliers (R+) increase reliance on the retailer’s previous order quantity 
as forecast for future demand from the same retailer.  As a result, these suppliers (R+) are 
relying less on the anchoring at the previous order quantity policy.   
The opposite trends are observed by retailers under a loose relationship (R-).  
Figure 52 shows an increasing trend in q (R-) over time and a decreasing trend in d (R-).  
This implies the suppliers under a loose relationship (R-) prefer to anchor on the previous 
order quantity over the course of time.  These suppliers (R-) rely less on the retailer’s 
previous order quantity.   





















and conclude with 95% that R+ suppliers relied more on retailers’ demand than R- 
suppliers. 
6.6 Experiment III Conclusion 
This Section concludes the empirical study on this multi-echelon NV supply chain 
experiment.  Figure 53 shows that supplier’s average order quantities systematically 
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deviate from the profit maximizing order quantities (EOQ).  This result confirms human 
decision bias exists in this multi-echelon NV system for these subjects.   
 
Figure 53: Exp. III Supplier’s Average Order Quantity vs.  Order Period 
 The relationship between suppliers and retailers empirically shows improvement 
to the supplier’s decision making in terms of proportion of total supply chain profit for 
the suppliers.  The MEHDB model shows an interesting trend in the supplier’s preference 
on different procurement policies over time.  Suppliers under a tight relationship with 
retailers show increasingly more reliance on a retailer’s order quantity to determine their 
next order quantity.  Suppliers under a loose relationship with retailers show preference 
to anchoring their decision on their own previous order quantity.  This empirical result 
indicates that supplier subjects who deal with the same retailer subjects become more 
confident in using demand from the retailer to forecast subsequent demand. 
 The MEHDB model fit for the supplier’s order quantity indicates a significant 
chasing retailer’s demand heuristics in these supplier subjects under both relationship 
treatment conditions.  This is a reversal from the result obtained in the single NV setting, 
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where demand chasing heuristics were not significant.  This indicates that human-to-
human interaction between supplier and retailer is different from the human-to-computer 
interaction between retailer and the consumer.  The computer generated demand is less 
predictable than the human decision. 
 The risk-seeking preference under loss, when it persists over longer ordering 
period and substantiated by large proportion of NV subjects, can blur the impact of well 
established main effects such as the item profit margin and NV’s initial wealth.  This 
behavior, consistent with Prospect Theory, is most apparent for the low profit margin 
condition.  The impact of this behavior may be crystallized in a longer experiment, when 
the desire to “make up for losses” conceived a risk-seeking behavior.  Some subjects 
under the high initial wealth and low profit margin condition actually ordered at a level of 
negative expected profit.   
 A reversed “Bullwhip Effect” is evident in this multi-echelon NV system.  
Analysis of the variations at different levels of this NV supply chain indicates the 
variation of order quantity decreases upstream in the NV supply chain.  The most 
significant reduction of variance is between the consumer’s order quantity and the 
retailers’ order quantity.  This reversed “Bullwhip Effect” can be attributed to the fact 
that the no lead time and the no inventory holding assumption in the NV system reduces 
the some sources of the “Bullwhip Effect”. 
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CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDIES OF HUMAN DECISION BIAS AND THE DESIGN 
OF NEWSVENDOR SYSTEMS 
 
This Chapter illustrates the impact of human decision bias on the performance of a 
newsvendor (NV) supply chain system.  Empirical results of both the single NV 
experiment and the multi-echelon NV supply chain experiment have shown that human 
decision in NV systems to systematically deviate from theoretical model solutions.  Two 
NV case studies in this chapter illustrate the impact of various HDB assumptions on their 
optimal solutions.  Due to its significant impact on the performance of NV systems, this 
chapter makes a case that human decision bias should be included in NV supply chain 
design models.   
7.1 S-D Network Problem 
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Consider a simple Supply-Demand (S-D) network problem with 2 supply nodes and 3 
demand nodes as depicted by Figure 54.  The problem objective is to minimize the total 
cost of satisfying demand at demand node j, which is uniformly distributed between 0 
and 300.  Each supply node i, when activated, will incur fixed costs of 2100 and 1900 per 
order period respectively.  Notice that the unit transportation cost, given as arc labels, is 
structured in such a way that the optimal solution will only include one supply node 
because the maximum transportation cost of 300*(1+2+3) = 1800 is less than the 
minimum cost of an additional location of 1900. 
 
Figure 55: Solution to 2S3D Network Problem with Expected Demand Assumption 
 There are at least two ways to deal with the stochastic demand.  One approach is 
to use the expected demand of 150 for each node Dj, which will results in an optimal 
solution of using only supply node, S2 to satisfy demand at all 3 demand nodes as shown 
by Figure 55.  The total cost for this solution is 1900+150*(1+2+3) = 2800.  Another 
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network problem for many runs to get the best solution of this stochastic problem.  We 
simulated 30 instances for this problem to illustrate this solution technique.  The result of 
each instance is shown in Table 34.  Supply node, S1 is chosen 23% of the time, while S2 
is chosen 77% of the time.  Therefore, the optimal solution to minimize total expected 
cost of satisfying demand at nodes D1, D2, and D3 is S2. 
Table 34: Simulation Results of 2S3D Problem 
  
Demand 
Uniform(0,300) Total Cost Choice 
Instance D1 D2 D3 S1 S2 S1 Yes S2 Yes 
1 68 167 245 3237 2683 0 1 
2 247 83 263 3302 3070 0 1 
3 129 125 72 2695 2609 0 1 
4 242 232 219 3463 3309 0 1 
5 202 1 84 2556 2592 1 0 
6 285 204 281 3636 3444 0 1 
7 105 66 277 3168 2624 0 1 
8 140 120 93 2759 2653 0 1 
9 282 38 183 3007 3005 0 1 
10 190 152 40 2714 2814 1 0 
11 114 196 120 2966 2754 0 1 
12 30 266 135 3067 2657 0 1 
13 172 263 182 3344 3124 0 1 
14 240 126 26 2670 2898 1 0 
15 114 254 175 3247 2925 0 1 
16 297 45 163 2976 3044 1 0 
17 170 171 194 3194 2946 0 1 
18 195 191 35 2782 2902 1 0 
19 86 164 93 2793 2579 0 1 
20 5 90 276 3113 2371 0 1 
21 189 264 187 3378 3182 0 1 
22 93 40 234 2975 2493 0 1 
23 232 290 257 3683 3433 0 1 
24 2 32 80 2406 2050 0 1 
25 146 16 233 2977 2603 0 1 
26 88 13 290 3084 2480 0 1 
27 250 11 89 2639 2761 1 0 
28 96 50 225 2971 2513 0 1 
29 253 30 186 2971 2905 0 1 
30 262 217 86 3054 3206 1 0 
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Consider this 2S3D problem as a newsvendor problem with different cost 
structures in each of the demand nodes.  For example, let us assume that the item profit 
margin for nodes D1 and D2 is 0.75 and the item profit margin for node D3 is 0.25, then 
the EOQ is 225 units for nodes D1 and D2 and 75 units for node D3.  The cost of using 
only supply node, S1 to satisfy demand at all 3 demand nodes = 2100 + 225*(1+2) + 75*3 
= 3000.  The cost of using only supply node, S2 to satisfy demand at all 3 demand nodes 
= 1900 + 225*(3+2) + 75*1 = 3100.  Therefore, the optimal solution is obtained by using 
only supply node, S1 to satisfy demand at all 3 demand nodes as shown in Figure 56 (a).   
 
Figure 56: Solutions to 2S3D Newsvendor Network Problem 
Another supply chain modeler may consider retailers to exhibit human decision 
bias.  Using the empirical data collected in Experiment I (Chapter 5), SC modeler 
calculates the average order quantities of the high profit margin item and the low profit 























(a) Without HDB 
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node, S1 to satisfy demand at all 3 demand nodes = 2100 + 158*(1+2) + 101*3 = 2877.  
The cost of using only supply node, S2 to satisfy demand at all 3 demand nodes = 1900 + 
158*(3+2) + 101*1 = 2791.  Therefore, the optimal solution is obtained by selecting 
supply node, S2 to satisfy demand at all 3 demand nodes as shown by Figure 56 (b).   
Table 35: Solutions of 2S3D NV Network Problem under Different Scenarios 
Scenario Optimal Location Total Cost 
EOQ S1 3000 
HDB S2 2791 
 
Table 35 presents the summary of the optimal solutions to this simple 2S3D 
network problem with and without the HDB assumption.  If this network problem is 
solved without considering the HDB, then the total cost will be 2100 + 158*(1+2) + 
101*3 = 2877, which is 86 more than the total of the optimal solution considering the 
HDB.  The result illustrates how the human decision bias can change the optimal solution 
to a stochastic S-D network problem.   
7.2 Supply Chain Design with Human Decision Bias: A Case Study 
The case study in this Section illustrates how HDB can impact the performance of a NV 
supply chain system if the SC modeler does not account for such bias.   
Consider an organic tofu manufacturer, SoyEZ who seeks to set up a food 
processing operation in one of 25 major metropolitan areas in US where half of the US 
population resides (Figure 57).  The demand for organic food in US, an estimated $14.5 
 147  
billion industry, is growing at an annual rate of 20-24% and is the fastest growing 
segment of food industry according to the Organic Trade Association (www.ota.com). 
 
Figure 57: Map of Major US Metropolitans  
Some drawbacks to this new product are the highly unpredictable demand and the 
short shelf life.  The demand of this new product in each metropolitan area, j can only be 
assumed to be uniformly distributed between [0, 2*Dj], where Dj, the average demand, is 
proportional to the population at location j.  Due to the short shelf life, the delivery of this 
fresh produce must be expedited if the traveling distance is more than 1500 miles.  
Therefore, the retailers outside of the 1500 miles radius have to pay a premium cost of 
$90 and those within 1500 miles from the selected manufacturing location pay $30 per 
unit.  The MSRP of this organic tofu in all metropolitan areas is set at $120 per unit.  
SoyEZ assumes all cost to deliver products to the retailers.  This fixation of retail price is 
commonplace in the fresh produce industry (Chalfant et al., 2003).  The logistics cost 
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structure includes a fixed cost of $300,000 and a transportation cost proportional to the 
distance between the wholesale location and the retailer’s location.   
This single location selection problem for the supplier can be formulated as the 




































yi : binary 
Where 
i: The set of supply nodes. 
j: The set of demand nodes. 
xij: The decision variable of the amount of product to ship from i to j. 
yi: The decision variable of selecting to set up distribution in location i. 
cij: The unit cost to ship product from i to j. 
fi: The fixed cost to operate at location i. 
di: The demand at location j. 
M: A (big M) constant value greater than the maximum demand at any node j. 
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This single location selection problem under uncertainty is commonly solved in 
one of these ways.  The first method is to solve the problem deterministically by 
assuming fixed demands at each node.  Some reasonable fixed demand values are the 
expected demand or the EOQ for NV type products.  Another method is to simulate 
multiple instances of the deterministic problem and compile the solutions to select the 
best option.  This technique was used to solve the 2S3D network problem earlier.  For 
this single location selection problem the expected demand method and the simulation 
method yield the same result. 
The human decision bias found in the NV decision-making can be modeled in this 
location selection problem under uncertainty.  A NV retailer with a bias parameter, b 
when presented with item profit margin, m will order at (m-(m-0.5)b)*2D.  For example, 
consider a low profit margin (m=0.25) and a high profit margin (m=0.75) NV investment 
options whose demand is Uniform [0,100].  A slightly bias newsvendor (b=0.1) when 
faced with this NV investment opportunity will order (0.25-(0.25-0.5)*0.1)*100=27.5 at 
the low profit margin condition and (0.75-(0.75-0.5)*0.1)*100=72.5 at the high profit 
margin condition.  Another newsvendor with b = 1 will order 50 units at both the low 
profit margin and the high profit margin conditions.   
Table 36: Fresh Produce Location Solution Summary 
 EOQ Average Slight (b=0.1) 
High 
(b=0.5) 2E 2E R+ 2E R- 
Location Washington Las Vegas New York LA LA LA LA 
Profit $ 126,796 $183,930 $120,583 $143,820 $108,045 $100,435 $115,695 
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The bias parameter, b and the normalized human decision bias data from the 
multi-echelon NV supply chain experiment are used to generate different scenarios of 
retailer’s behaviors.  Table 36 shows the optimal location and optimal profit for SoyEZ 
under various assumptions of retailer’s behaviors.  For example, if the retailers are 
assumed to order at the EOQ of the classic NV solution then SoyEZ should locate its 
operation at Washington DC for a maximum expected profit of $126,796.  However, if 
retailers are assumed to order the mean demand then SoyEZ should locate its operation at 
Las Vegas for a maximum expected profit of $183,930.  If retailers exhibit decision bias 
proportional to the empirical results of multi-echelon NV experiment (2E), then the 
optimal location will be Los Angeles with an expected profit of $108,045.  Similarly, if 
the relationship between the suppliers and the retailers are tight (2E R+) or loose (2E R-), 
then the expected profit will be $100,435 and $115,695 respectively.  It is clear from this 
example that the optimal solution of this location selection problem depends largely on 
the various assumptions of the HDB. 
Table 37: What-if Analysis on the Impacts of Assuming no Human Decision Bias 
 Outcome 
Washington, DC EOQ Average Slight (b=0.1) 
High 
(b=0.5) 2E 2E R+ 2E R- 
Loss in Profit 0 -66.6% -0.3% -34.6% -76.3% -91.4% -63.2% 
 
What if the SoyEZ makes a wrong assumption about the demand?   
Case 1: SoyEZ assumes the retailers will follow the EOQ from the classical newsvendor 
solution in placing their orders and sets up its operation at Washington, DC.  Table 37 
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summarizes the percentage of loss in profit for the supplier due to different scenarios of 
HDB.  If the retailers indeed order at EOQ then the loss in profit is zero.  However, if 
retailers order at high level of human decision bias (b=0.5), then SoyEZ will make 34.6% 
less than the optimal profit had the location been set in Los Angeles.  The greatest loss in 
profit is found in the situation where the retailers and suppliers had tight relationship, 
which is perhaps the most likely situation since there is only one supplier of this organic 
tofu. 
Table 38: What-if Analysis on the Impacts of Assuming Average Order Quantity 
 Outcome 
Las Vegas EOQ Average Slight (b=0.1) 
High 
(b=0.5) 2E 2E R+ 2E R- 
Profit Difference -49.0% 0% -36.4% -13.6% -16.3% -0.2% -19.5% 
Case 2: The retailers are assumed to order at the average demand level, and the 
wholesaler places its operation at Las Vegas.  Table 38 summarizes the percentage of loss 
in profit for the supplier due to different scenarios of HDB.  For example, if retailers 
order at high level of human decision bias (b=0.5), then SoyEZ will make 13.6% less 
than the optimal profit had the location been set in Los Angeles.  Comparing the overall 
scenario outcomes in Table 37 and Table 38, we observed the assumption of average 
demand to be more robust than the assumption of classic newsvendor solution. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This Chapter summarizes major findings of this research and proposes future research 
ideas.  This research is motivated by the recent discovery of human decision bias in the 
classical NV problem and the potential impacts of this bias on the performance of NV 
systems.  Current empirical results describe NV decision-making to be inconsistent with 
risk-seeking, risk-aversion, Prospect Theory, and other utility models (Schweitzer and 
Cachon, 2000).  Enhancement of the feedback to the decision-makers in another NV 
empirical study improves NV decision-making but fails to eliminate human decision bias 
(Bolton and Katok, 2004).  These empirical results focus on alternating levels of item 
profit margins to study NV decision-making. 
 This research purports to explore additional factors influencing NV decision-
making and purposes a human decision bias (HDB) model as a framework to describe 
and compare NV decision-making under alternative conditions.  Single and multiple NV 
experiments were set up to test the significance of decision-maker’s initial wealth, item 
profit margin, item salvage value, NV training, and the interaction between supplier and 
retailer.  A total of 171 student subjects were recruited to participate in various NV 
experiments.  Empirical data from these experiments are fitted on the HDB regression 
model to distinguish most prominent NV procurement policies.  Business case studies 
were set up to illustrate the impact of human decision bias on the performance of NV 
systems. 
 This research is not without its limitations.  First, the human decision bias (HDB) 
regression model can only ascertain the relationship between NV decision-making and 
various predestined theoretical NV procurement policies.  However, we will not know the 
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underlying causal mechanism of NV decision-making process precisely because there 
may be alternative causal explanations not included in the HDB model.  This research 
chooses the most reasonable independent variables for the HDB model from the 
empirical and theoretical results of NV decision bias (Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), 
Bolton and Katok (2004)).  Second, the college student subjects may have different 
objectives from the real-life business managers.  Therefore, the empirical evidence found 
in these experiments may not apply to real life procurement managers in general or 
students of other disciplines and levels.  Third, the anecdotal evidence of the impact of 
HDB on the optimal solutions of an US organic food network in Chapter 7 should not be 
perceived as facts without trepidation.  The dearth of real data in the fresh produce 
market has limited the case study to truly reflect reality of this industry.  Finally, this 
research assumes no contractual agreement between the suppliers and the retailers of the 
NV supply chain.  The complexity of the contracts between suppliers and retailers, which 
are commonplace in real life supply chain, are beyond the scope of this research. 
The major results are separated into 2 sections.  The first section describes the 
empirical results from various NV experiments and the second section describes the 
relationship between human decision bias and NV system design.  Future research ideas 
are presented last. 
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8.1 Bias in the Newsvendor Decision-Making 
This Section presents major empirical results of the single and the multi-echelon 
newsvendor (NV) experiments.   
1. This research validates the existence of human decision bias in NV system.  The 
order quantity of the newsvendor decision-makers in single and multi-echelon NV 
settings systematically deviate from the profit maximizing order quantities.  The 
subjects ordered too high for low profit margin condition and ordered too little for 
the high profit margin condition. 
2. The NV initial wealth significantly influences NV decision making.  Subjects 
with higher initial wealth order more than subjects with lower initial wealth under 
the low profit margin condition.  The impact of this NV preference is quite far 
reaching.  Wealthier NV subjects are found to exhibit a risk-seeking behavior 
after suffering losses in the NV experiment.  Empirical data from the multi-
echelon NV experiments show more experienced NV retailer subjects order at a 
level which has expected profit less than zero.  This investment option likens to 
the acceptance of a risky gamble with negative expected payoff. 
3. The item salvage value does not significantly affect NV decision-making when 
the item profit margin does not change.  Empirical results show NV subjects to be 
indifferent between NV investment with zero salvage value and NV investment 
with nonzero salvage value. 
4. The theoretical NV training session does not significantly improve newsvendors’ 
decision-making.  Subjects who perform very well in the theoretical NV problem 
exercises continue to exhibit human decision bias in the NV experiment.  This 
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result confirms that student subjects exhibit human decision bias not because they 
forget the solution to the classical NV problem as suggested by previous NV 
empirical study (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000).  A major distinction between the 
theoretical NV exercises and the NV experiments is that there is only one right 
answer to the classroom exercise and there is no right or wrong answers in the NV 
experiments.  Students in the classroom will answer in such away to pass the test 
and students in the NV experiment will order as they want without trepidation of 
failing the test. 
5. Decision-makers utilize an anchoring and adjustment heuristics to make NV 
procurement decision.  Subjects tend to anchor at the previous order quantity and 
adjust according to posterior feedbacks.  The HDB model demonstrates that the 
decision-makers relied significantly on their previous order quantity under various 
NV experimental settings.  This result highlights the importance of influencing 
NV’s first order quantity.   
6. A reversed “Bullwhip Effect” is evident in the multi-echelon NV supply chain 
experiment.  The empirical analysis of the order quantities of the subjects in the 
multi-echelon newsvendor experiment demonstrates an upstream diminution of 
the oscillation of agent’s order quantities the supply chain.  This research 
conjectures that the no inventory holding and the no lead time assumptions of the 
NV supply chain experiments may have reduced the “Bullwhip Effect” 
commonplace in supply chain of durable products.  The reversed “Bullwhip 
Effect” in the newsvendor supply chain systems implies that the suppliers face 
less uncertainty in demand than the retailers do.  Therefore, the NV suppliers 
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enjoy higher average profit per unit and higher share of the total supply chain 
profit than the retailers do.  This disparity in the performance of suppliers and 
retailers is most apparent when the suppliers are dealing with the same retailers 
over time. 
7. Empirical data shows that human decision bias accounts for more than 17% in 
loss of profit in the single NV setting and a 25% in loss of profit in the multi-
echelon NV setting.  By definition, any deviation from the optimal NV ordering 
policy will adversely impacts the profitability of the NV system.  This adverse 
effect is compounded when more NV agents are involved in the multi-echelon 
NV systems.  Empirical results indicate the loss of profit due to human decision 
bias is significantly more than the loss of profit due to non-cooperation between 
suppliers and retailers.  Improvement to NV decision-making will significantly 
improve the bottom line of the NV supply chain systems. 
 
8.2 Human Decision Bias and Newsvendor Supply Chain Design 
This section discusses how the human decision bias affects the performance of a NV 
supply chain system and argues for its incorporation in the design of a NV supply chain. 
Due to high demand uncertainty of NV type products such as woman’s fashion, 
Halloween customs, and Christmas ornaments, retailers generally desire to order as late 
as possible, so that they can have better demand forecast.  On the other hand, the 
manufacturers and distributors, with their limited resource, desire more time prior to 
selling season to plan for production and to avoid excessive overtime charges.  This 
tension exists universally in all supply chain systems (Chen and Xu, 2001).   
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The impact of the human decision bias on SC performance is most apparent in a 
situation where all agents of the supply chain are required to set aside resource in 
advance of the selling season.  If suppliers do not have to commit resources before 
receiving retailer’s order, then the impact of human decision bias is limited to the 
retailer’s loss of profit.  However, the supply chain tension described above will 
inevitably cause the suppliers to commit some resources prior to receiving orders from 
retailers. 
Ignoring the human decision bias in NV supply chain system can be costly.  
Empirical evidence from the NV experiments indicates that human decision bias 
accounted for more than 25% of loss in total supply chain profit in the multi-echelon NV 
setting and more than 17% of loss in profit in the single NV setting. 
The human decision bias in NV system, classifiable as an error in demand 
forecast bias, will impact the performance of SC system more adversely than other 
forecast errors.  Lee et al.  (1997) show that out of the two types forecasting errors, errors 
in forecast bias (the mean) has a more significant impact on production system 
performance than errors in forecast variability (the variance).  The HDB, a systematic 
deviation from various model solutions, fits the description of an error in demand forecast 
bias.   
Some mitigation to the potential problems caused by forecasting errors can be 
applied to reduce the impact of HDB.  Wei et al.  (2002) show that early order 
commitment by retailer can alleviate the impact of forecast error on supply chain 
performance.  The forecasting of consumer demand is quite difficult, but if the retailers 
provide some initial order quantities prior to the realization of consumer demand, then the 
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supply chain performs better.  Byrnes and Shapiro (1992) empirically examined the 
Bullwhip effect in the medical supply industry which is associated with the error in 
forecast variability.  The investigators implement some fixed order policies in the 
hospitals, and as the result, the hospitals save substantial cost due to reduction in the 
storage space requirement.  These results indicate that reduction of forecast errors, such 
as those caused by the HDB, can improve supply chain performance. 
 The human decision bias needs to be accounted for in supply chain design, not 
only because of its adverse effects indicated above, but also because it assaults two basic 
assumptions of the analytical techniques conventionally used to design a SC system 
under uncertainty.  First assumption is that consumer demand is propagated in the SC 
without any changes and can be used as requirement for all agents in the supply chain.  
Empirical results from this multi-echelon NV supply chain experiments show that the 
demand distribution has changed from customers to retailers and from retailers to 
suppliers in terms of its mean and its variance.  Second assumption is that retailers will 
order according to some very reasonable models, such as the expected demand 
procurement policy or the classic NV problem procurement policy.  Empirical results 
from this dissertation and others have shown a systematic deviation of decision-maker’s 
order quantities from the expected demand level and profit maximizing EOQ (Schweitzer 
and Cachon (2000) and Bolton and Katok (2004)). 
Case study of US fresh produce supply chain system in Chapter 7 shows the 
potential problems of ignoring human decision bias.  Analysis reveals even slight human 
decision bias may change the solution of the location selection problem quite 
dramatically.  For example, the optimal location under the expected demand assumption 
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is in the West Coast, and the optimal location under assumption that retailers exhibit 
slight HDB is in the East coast. 
 
8.3 Research Extensions 
This section highlights some future research ideas for individual NV and multi-echelon 
NV decision-making.  The dearth of empirical evidence significantly undermines the 
validity of the voluminous theoretical research of NV problem, especially when early 
evidences consistently point to a systematic discrepancy between the empirical and 
theoretical results.   
For further empirical research of single NV decision-making, investigators will 
investigate if de-biasing methods such as the graphical mapping method (Roy et al., 1996) 
and the warning method (Block et al., 1991) will improve NV performance.  Different 
treatment conditions of item profit margins such as (p=4, c=1, s=0) and (p=4, c=3, s=0) 
can be compared to previously tested item profit margins conditions (p=12, c=3, s=0) and 
(p=12, c=9, s=0) to investigate if changes in the expected profit / order will affect NV 
decision-making.  Finally, longer experiment can be set up to compare NV decision-
making in the high cost high initial wealth and the high cost low initial wealth conditions.  
This experiment will verify if subjects who have suffered loss will behave differently 
from those who have made profit given the same NV investment option and wealth. 
For further empirical research of NV decision-making in the multi-echelon supply 
chain setting, investigators may consider a “Newspaper Distribution Game” where 
inventory holding is disallowed at certain levels of the supply chain.  This NV game can 
be set up with various objectives such as maximizing total supply chain profit, 
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maximizing individual NV profit, minimizing total waste, and maximizing customer 
service.  Independent variables commonplace in the classic “Beer Distribution Game” 
such as lead time, consumer demand distribution, and information sharing can be added 
to the list of factors such as item profit margin, supplier-retailer relationship, and NV’s 
initial wealth considered in this research.  More dynamic variables commonplace in the 
fresh produce industry such as contract negotiation between supplier and retailer, multi 
NV products, and imperfect knowledge about cost and demand may prove to be the most 
exciting extension of current empirical studies of NV problem.  We believe that 
experiments like these can illuminate the complexity of managing supply chain of 
newsvendor products and provide suggestions for improving its performance. 
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